GIRIDHAR G. YADALAM versus COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX &ANR.
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[2015] 15 S.C.R. 543 GIRIDHAR G. YADALAM v. COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX &ANR. (Civil Appeal No. 728 of 2011) JULY24, 2015 [A. K. SIKRI AND R. F. NARIMAN, JJ.] A B Wealth Tax Act, 1957: s.2(ea)(v), Explanation 1 (b) - Urban land - Exemption to wealth tax - Held: Benefit of exemption in respect of urban land is available only when C the building is fully constructed and not when the construction activity has merely started - In the instant case, asses see is not entitled to benefit of exemption under the clause as the building was still under construction during the assessment year. D Interpretation of Statutes: Taxing statute - Held: In taxing statute, it is the plain language of the provision that has to be preferred where language is plain and is capable of one definite meaning. Disposing of the matters, the Court E HELD: 1. The plain language of the prov1s1on in question conveys that the benefit of the said clause would be applicable only in respect of the building 'which has been constructed'. The expression 'has been F constructed' obviously cannot include within its sweep a building which is not fully constructed or in the process of construction. The opening words of clause (ii) also become important in this behalf, where it is stated that 'the land occupied by any building'. The land G cannot be treated to be occupied by a building where it is still under construction. In taxing statute, it is the plain language of the provision that has to be preferred where language is plain and is capable of one definite meaning. 543 H 544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 15 S.C.R. A Strict interpretation to the exemption provision is to be accorded, which is the case at hand. The purposive interpretation can be given only when there is some ambiguity in the language of the statutory provision or it leads to absurd results. There is no ambiguity as such B in the present case. [Para 16] [551-G-H; 552-A-B, E-G] c M. Nizamuden v. Chemplast Sanmar Limited and Ors. (2010) 4 sec 240 : 2010 (3) SCR 315 - referred to. Case Law Reference 2010ยท (3) SCR 315 referred to. Para 11 CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 728 of 2011. o From the Judgment and Order dated 21.03.2007 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in WTA No. 25 of 2006. WITH C.A.Nos. 729,730,731,732,733,734,735, 736, 737, E 738, 739, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780 OF 2011 . F SLP(C) Nos. 19011 and 19012 of 2012 . Gopal Jain, Sr. Adv., Ms. Chinmayee Chandra, Ms. Khushboo Bari, Mrs. Nandini Gore, Kartik Bhatnagar, Ms. Trishula Kulkarni, Mis. Karanjawala & Co., Advs. for the Appellant. G Rupesh Kumar, S. A. Haseeb, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Ms. Sadhna Sandhu, Vikash Malhotra, Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, B. V. Balaram Das, Abhijat P. Medh, Advs., for the Respondents. H GIRIDHAR G. YADALAM v. COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH 545 TAX&ANR. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A . A. K. SIKRI, J. 1. In these cases, we are concerned with the interpretation that is to be accorded to the provisions of Explanation 1 (b) to Section 2( ea)(v) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). This Explanation defines 'Urban Land'. Urban land is exigible to wealth tax under the B aforesaid Act. However; the definition of 'urban land' in explanation 1 (b) excludes certain category of lands. As per Explanation 1 (b) to Section 2(ea)(v), 'urban land' to mean land situate - but does not includes:- (i) land classified as 'agricultural land' in the records of the Government and used for agricultural purposes or land on which construction of a building is not permissible under any law for the time being in force in the area in which such land is situated; or ยท (ii) the land occupied by any building which has been constructed with the approval of the appropriate authority; or c D (iii) any unused land held by the assessee for industrial purposes for a period of two years from the date of its acquisition by him; or E (iv) any land held by the assessee as 'stock-in-trade' for a period of ten years from the date of its acquisition. 2. To put it pithily, what calls for interpretation is clause (ii) above, namely, what is the meaning that is to be attributed F to the expression "the land occupied by any buildin
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