GIAN DASS versus THE GRAM PANCHAYAT, VILLAGE SUNNER KALAN AND ORS.

Citation: [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 781 · Decided: 21-07-2006 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Disposed off
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Judgment (excerpt)

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GIAN DASS 
A 
v. 
THE GRAM PANCHAYAT, VILLAGE SUNNER KALAN AND ORS. 
JULY 21, 2006 
[ARIJITPASA YAT AND LOKESHWARSINGH PANT A, JJ.] 
B 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section JOO-Second appeal-
Jurisdiction of High Court-ls confined to appeals involving substantial 
questions of law-Impugned judgment passed by High Court does not show C 
that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that the second 
appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated-Such judgment 
cannot be maintained-Land Laws-Punjab Village Common Lands 
(Regulation) Act, 1961-Section I I. 
A suit for possession in respect of the land in dispute was decreed by D 
both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court on the ground that the 
plaintiff (appellant) is Saunjidar of the land and he had been dispossessed 
forcibly and illegally. High Court in second appeal, however, held that only 
the Collector under Section 11 of the Punjab Village Common Lands 
(Regulation) Act, 1961 can adjudicate on the issue of Saunjidar rights and 
the Civil Court has no jurisdiction upon the matter. Accordingly the appeal E 
was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below set aside. 
In appeal before this Court it was urged by the Appellant that the High 
Court erred in disposing of the second appeal without formulating the 
substantial question or questions of law, as mandated by Section 100 CPC. F 
Respondent pleaded that though no substantial question oflaw was formulated 
before the second appeal was adjudicated, yet that is permissible, because 
proviso to sub Section (5) of Section 100 permits the High Court to decide a 
second appeal on a different substantial question of law subject to recording 
of reasons. 
Remitting back the matter to High Court, the Court 
HELD: 1. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High .court 
does not show that any substantial question of law has been formulated or 
that the second appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated. That 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
A being so, the judgment cannot be maintained. (784-C-D] 
lshwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, (2000] I SCC 434; Roop Singh v. Ram 
Singh, [2000] 3 SCC 708; Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar, [2003] I SCC 430; 
Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram and Ors., (2004] 6 SCC 359; Joseph Severane 
and Ors. v. Benny Mathew and Ors., [2005) 7 SCC 667 and Sasikumar and 
B Ors. v. Kunnath Chellapan Nair and Ors., [2005] 12 SCC 588, relied on. 
2. The plea about proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 instead of 
supporting the stand of the respondent rather goes against them. The proviso 
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is applicable only when any substantial question of law has already been 
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C formulated and it empowers the High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, 
the appeal on any other substantial question of law. The expression "on any 
other substantial question of law" clearly shows that there must be some 
substantial question of law already formulated and then only another 
substantial question oflaw which was not formulated earlier can be taken up 
by the High Court for reasons to be recorded, if it is of the view that the case 
D involves such question. [785-G-H; 786-A[ 
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3086 of2006. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.9.2004 of the High Court of 
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, in R.S.A. No. 895/1984. 
S.K. Bagga, Seeraj Bagga and Sureshta Bagga for the Appellant. 
lshwar Singh, Vimal, Dinesh Verma and A.P. Mohanty for the 
Respondents. 
F 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
ARIJIT PASAYA T, J. Leave granted. 
The appeal relates to a judgment delivered by a learned Single Judge 
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 895 of 
G 1984. The Second Appeal was filed by the defendants, in a suit for possession. 
The suit had been decreed by both the trial court and the first appellate court 
on the ground that the plaintiff (appellant) herein is the Saunjidar of the land 
in dispute and he had been dispossessed forcibly ·and illegally. The High 
Court held that when a person is claiming a title, right or interest in the 
property in dispute either being a owner or a saunjidar or tenant, then the 
H jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. Saunjidar right is an interest claimed 
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GIAN DASS v. THEGRAMPANCHA YAT, VILLAGESUNNERKALAN [PASA Y AT,J.] 
783 
by the plaintiff-the appellant herein. Therefore, th
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