GHANSHYAM DAS GUPTA versus DEVI LAL AND OTHERS
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A GHANSHYAM DAS GUPTA v. DEVI LAL AND OTHERS FEBRUARY 8, 1989 B [M.H. KANIA AND LAUT MOHAN SHARMA, JJ.] c Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1947: Section 11( l)(d)-Default in payment of rent-For the period prior to the Act made applicable to the area-Whether tenant liable to be evicted on that ground. The appellant was inducted as a tenant in the building in question under a document of lease. Since the deed was not executed in accor- dance with the requirements of law, it remained inoperative. After the lease period the owner instituted a suit for eviction of the appellant and for a decree for arrears of rent. During the pendency of the suit the D provisions of the Bihar Rent Act were extended to the area, and as such the prayer for withdrawal of the relief for eviction was allowed with leave to tile a fresh suit. However, decree for arrears of rent was pas- sed. Thereafter a fresh suit was tiled. The Trial Court decreed the suit on both the grounds of personal necessity and default in payment of rent. On· appeal the Subordinate Judge reversed the finding on the E question of bona fide personal necessity ;·but affirmed the decree on the ground of default . .The High Court, on appeal maintained the decree. The present appeal by special leave, is against the High Court's judgment. F On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that non-payment of~ rent (when the Bihar Rent Act was not applicable to the area) is not relevant and so it could not be legitimately made the basis for the decree of eviction. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that even independent of the Bihar Rent Act the appellant was under a duty to regularly pay the monthly rent and for the default, he must, be G presumed to be made liable for eviction under Section ll(l)(d) of the Act. Allowing this appeal, HELD: J • .There is no manner of doubt that the Act was applied H to the area concerned on 14.2.1970 with prospective effect. The ques- 552 G.D. GUPTA v. DEVI LAL 553 lion whether the Legislature intended to include previous default of the A tenant in payment of rent within the grounds for eviction has to be answered by construing the language of the relevant provisions in the Bihar Rent Act. JSSSC-D) . 2. Ordinarily where a tenant offers the rent which is refused by the landlord without any justifiable reason tlie tenant is held to have fully performed his duty. Under the Bihar Rent Act, however, the position is a little different. Even on the refusal by the landlord to accept rent lawfully offered by the tenant, the tenant is under a further duty as mentioned ins. 13(1) to remit such rent by postal money order to the landlord. Where a bona fide doubt arises as to the person who is entitled to receive rent the tenant is permitted by s. 13(2) to deposit the rent in the prescribed manner. The latter part of s. ll(l)(d), quoted above, deals with cases attracting s. 13. The result is that if a tenant has made a proper offer to pay the rent and the landlord has unreasonably refused to accept h, the tenant cannot escape the liability of eviction under clause (d) unless he proves that he had further remitted the rent B c by postal money order. This position is fully settled. If the situation is D analysed in this light it will be seen that clause (d) can be held to apply only where s. 13 of the Bihar Rent Act is attracted. If s. 13 cannot be applied to a particular situation, clause (d) also would not apply, Sec· tion 13 could not obviously be applicable before the Act was extended to the area in question. Consequently it must be held that the default for the earlier J>eriod cannot be the basis for a decree of eviction under s. ll(l)(d). l557G-H; 558A-C] K.C. Jain v. B.S. Grewal & Ors., 11965) 2 S.C.R. 36 distin~ guished. E 3. Since the question is dependent on an appraisal of the evidence ~~-led by the parties, the case should be remitted to the first appellant F court for the decision on the question whether the. landlord has proved the.,tenant's default in payment of rent for the period from Decem.ber 1973 to April 1974. If the Subordinate Judge comes It> the conclusion that the tenant did default within the meaning of s. l l(l)(d) of the Act for two months or more during this period, he would decree the suit; otherwise the suit would be dismissed. l559B-C] G ),. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2984 of 1983. From th1> Judgment and O
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