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GHANSHYAM DAS GUPTA versus DEVI LAL AND OTHERS

Citation: [1989] 1 S.C.R. 552 · Decided: 08-02-1989 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.H. KANIA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
GHANSHYAM DAS GUPTA 
v. 
DEVI LAL AND OTHERS 
FEBRUARY 8, 1989 
B 
[M.H. KANIA AND LAUT MOHAN SHARMA, JJ.] 
c 
Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1947: Section 
11( l)(d)-Default in payment of rent-For the period prior to the Act 
made applicable to the area-Whether tenant liable to be evicted on that 
ground. 
The appellant was inducted as a tenant in the building in question 
under a document of lease. Since the deed was not executed in accor-
dance with the requirements of law, it remained inoperative. After the 
lease period the owner instituted a suit for eviction of the appellant and 
for a decree for arrears of rent. During the pendency of the suit the 
D provisions of the Bihar Rent Act were extended to the area, and as such 
the prayer for withdrawal of the relief for eviction was allowed with 
leave to tile a fresh suit. However, decree for arrears of rent was pas-
sed. Thereafter a fresh suit was tiled. The Trial Court decreed the suit 
on both the grounds of personal necessity and default in payment of 
rent. On· appeal the Subordinate Judge reversed the finding on the 
E question of bona fide personal necessity ;·but affirmed the decree on the 
ground of default . .The High Court, on appeal maintained the decree. 
The present appeal by special leave, is against the High Court's 
judgment. 
F 
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that non-payment of~
rent (when the Bihar Rent Act was not applicable to the area) is not 
relevant and so it could not be legitimately made the basis for the decree 
of eviction. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that even 
independent of the Bihar Rent Act the appellant was under a duty to 
regularly pay the monthly rent and for the default, he must, be 
G presumed to be made liable for eviction under Section ll(l)(d) of the 
Act. 
Allowing this appeal, 
HELD: J • .There is no manner of doubt that the Act was applied 
H to the area concerned on 14.2.1970 with prospective effect. The ques-
552 
G.D. GUPTA v. DEVI LAL 
553 
lion whether the Legislature intended to include previous default of the 
A 
tenant in payment of rent within the grounds for eviction has to be 
answered by construing the language of the relevant provisions in the 
Bihar Rent Act. JSSSC-D) 
. 
2. Ordinarily where a tenant offers the rent which is refused by 
the landlord without any justifiable reason tlie tenant is held to have 
fully performed his duty. Under the Bihar Rent Act, however, the 
position is a little different. Even on the refusal by the landlord to 
accept rent lawfully offered by the tenant, the tenant is under a further 
duty as mentioned ins. 13(1) to remit such rent by postal money order 
to the landlord. Where a bona fide doubt arises as to the person who is 
entitled to receive rent the tenant is permitted by s. 13(2) to deposit the 
rent in the prescribed manner. The latter part of s. ll(l)(d), quoted 
above, deals with cases attracting s. 13. The result is that if a tenant has 
made a proper offer to pay the rent and the landlord has unreasonably 
refused to accept h, the tenant cannot escape the liability of eviction 
under clause (d) unless he proves that he had further remitted the rent 
B 
c 
by postal money order. This position is fully settled. If the situation is 
D 
analysed in this light it will be seen that clause (d) can be held to apply 
only where s. 13 of the Bihar Rent Act is attracted. If s. 13 cannot be 
applied to a particular situation, clause (d) also would not apply, Sec· 
tion 13 could not obviously be applicable before the Act was extended to 
the area in question. Consequently it must be held that the default for 
the earlier J>eriod cannot be the basis for a decree of eviction under s. 
ll(l)(d). l557G-H; 558A-C] 
K.C. Jain v. B.S. Grewal & Ors., 11965) 2 S.C.R. 36 distin~ 
guished. 
E 
3. Since the question is dependent on an appraisal of the evidence 
~~-led by the parties, the case should be remitted to the first appellant 
F 
court for the decision on the question whether the. landlord has proved 
the.,tenant's default in payment of rent for the period from Decem.ber 
1973 to April 1974. If the Subordinate Judge comes It> the conclusion 
that the tenant did default within the meaning of s. l l(l)(d) of the Act 
for two months or more during this period, he would decree the suit; 
otherwise the suit would be dismissed. l559B-C] 
G 
),. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2984 
of 1983. 
From th1> Judgment and O

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