GAYA PRASAD versus SH. PRADEEP SRIVASTAVA

Citation: [2001] 1 S.C.R. 923 · Decided: 07-02-2001 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K.T. THOMAS · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

GAYA PRASAD 
A 
v. 
SH. PRADEEPSRIVASTAVA 
FEBRUARY 7, 2001 
[K.T. THOMAS ANp DORAISWAMY RAJU, JJ.] 
B 
Rent and Eviction : 
U.P Urban Building (Regulation of le/ling, Rent and Eviction) Act, 
1972-Section 21 (J) (a)-Eviction Petition-Bona fide Requirement- C 
Litigation for 2 3 years-Order of eviction-Plea that subsequent joining of 
medical service by landlord's son overshadowing the bona fide requirement 
of the premises for housing his medical clinic-Plea negatived-Held, the 
crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the 
landlord is the date of his application for eviction-Every subsequent 
development during the post petition period cannot be taken into account D 
for judging such bona fides-The subsequent events to overshadow the 
genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that 
the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely 
eclipsed by such subsequent events. 
Practice and Procedure : 
Long pending matters-Evolution of some concrete schemes by High 
Court for their speedy disposal~Need for, emphasised. 
E 
Landlord/respondent filed an application under Section 2l(l)(a) lifthe 
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 F 
for eviction of his tenant/appellant. The eviction was sought on the ground 
that the building was needed for housing his son's clinic who had passed his 
medical examination and that he himself having recently retired wanted to 
start a radio repairing work using a portion of the building. The Prescribed 
Authority allowed the application and ordered eviction of the tenant/appellant. G 
Thereafter, an appeal was filed before the Appellate Court which was dismissed. 
Tenant/appellant then filed a writ petition. before High Court challenging his 
order of eviction. The High Court granted stay of operation of the eviction 
order whereafter the matter was kept pending for fifteen years before the 
same was dismissed. The tenant I appellant was, however, granted six months 
923 
H 
924 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2001} I S.C.R. 
A tiine to vacate the premises. Appellant again moved the.High Court for review 
of its order on the ground that the landlord's son, for whom the eviction was 
sought, joined the Provincial Medical Service after 12 years of the institution 
of the present proceeding. The said review petition was, however, dismissed. 
Hence the present appeals. 
B 
On behalf of the tenant/appellant, it was contended that subsequent 
c 
developments may also be taken into account in eviction proceeding, 
particularly when the eviction was sought by a landlord on the ground that he 
bona fide needed the building for his own use or for the use of any member 
of his family. 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
HELD : I. The subsequent events pleaded and highlighted by the 
appellant are too insufficient to overshadow the bona fide need concurrently 
found by the fact finding courts. During 23 years after the landlord moved 
D for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord 
nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining 
any n~w assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of 
forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. The crucial date for deciding 
as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his 
application for eviction. If every subsequent development during the post 
E petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the 
requirement pleaded by the landlord, there would perhaps be no end so long 
as the unfortunate situation in the litigative slow process system subsists. It 
is a stark reality that the longer the life of the litigation the more would be 
the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. It is 
F 
pernicious and unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of 
his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the 
litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente 
lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such 
unduly long period. The subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of 
the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need 
G propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by 
such subsequent events. 1930-F; 928-A; 927-G-H; 928-B; 928-C; 929-CI 
Ramesh Kumar v. 

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