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GARIKAPATTI VEERAYA versus N. SUBBIAH CHOUDHURY

Citation: [1957] 1 S.C.R. 488 · Decided: 01-02-1957 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SUDHI RANJAN DAS · Disposal: Leave granted

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Judgment (excerpt)

1957 
February, I. 
488 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
GARIKAPA TTI VEERAYA 
v. 
N. SUBBIAH CHOUDHURY 
[1957] 
[S. R. DAS 
C. J., 
BHAGWATI, 
VENKATARAMA 
AYYAR, 
B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAs J J.J 
Supreme Court, Appellate furisdiction of-Dea·ee in suit insti· 
tuted prio1· to the Constitution reversed in appeal by High Court ofter 
the Constitution-Value of subject-matter short of twenty-thousand-
Appeal, if lies-Vested 1·ight of appeal-Constitution of India, Arts. 
133, 135. 
This application for $pecial leave to appeal arose out of .a 
suit instituted on April 22, 1949, and valued at Rs. 11,400. The 
Trial Court dismissed the suit and the High Court in appeal 
reversed that decision on February 
IO, 1955. 
Application for 
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused by the High 
Court on the ground that the value did not come upto Rs. 20,000. 
It was contended on behalf of the applicant that he had a vested 
right of appeal to the Federal Court under the law as it then 
stood and that Court having been substituted by the Supreme 
Court, he was as of right entitled to appeal to that Court under 
Art. 135 of the Constitution. 
Held, (per Das C.J., Bhagwati, B. P. Sinha and S. K. Das JJ., 
Venkatarama 
Ayyar J. dissenting) 
that the contention of the 
applicant was well-founded, that he had a vested right of appeal 
to the Federal Court on and from the date of the suit and the 
application for special leave should be allowed. 
The vested right of appeal was a substantive right and, 
although it could be exercised only in case of an adverse decision, it 
was governed by the law prevailing at the time of commenttment 
of the suit and comprised all successive rights of appeal from 
court to court, which really constituted one 
proceeding. 
Such a 
right could be taken away only by a subsequent enactment either 
cxprCssly or by necessary intendment. 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving, (1905) A.C. 
369, followed. 
Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin, (1929) I.L.R. 56 Cal. 512 and ln re 
Vasudeva Samiar, (1928) I.L.R. 52 Mad. 361, relied on. 
Casc~law ·reviewed. 
Article 133 of the Constitution had no application to such 
cases. 
It was not intended to have retrospective operation so as 
co tak~ a.way this vested 
right nor did it do so either in express 
terms or by necessary intendment. 
Correctly construed it should 
be read as restricted to only those judgments, decrees and final 
orders of a High Court in respect of which there was no such 
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
489 
vested right of appeal, as otherwise cl. 20 of the Adaptation of 
Laws Order, 1950, which saves such a right, would become nuga-
tory. 
A litigant in a Princely State who could have no vested 
right of appeal to the Federal Court must, however, come under 
Art. 133. 
]anardan Reddy v. The Staie, (1950), S.C.R. 940, Keshavan 
Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay, (1951) S.C.R. 228 and 
Dajisahib Mane v. Shankar Rao Vithal Rao, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 872, 
referred to. 
This vested right of appeal acquired under the old b w was a 
matter contemplated by Art. 135 of the Constitution in relation 
to which the jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Court were 
exercisable at the commencement of the Constitution and as such 
it was within the purview of the appellate 
jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, and the appeal was entertainable by it. Article 
135 could not be limited to such 
cas~ only where the right of 
appeal had actually arisen in a concrete form, and was no mere 
potentiality, immediately before the Constitution. 
Ramaswami Chettiar v. The Official Receiver, A.LR. 1951 Mad. 
1051, 
Veeranna v. 
Chi11a 
Venkanna, 
I.L.R. 
1953 Mad. 1079, 
Probirendra Mohan v. Berhampore Bank Ltd. A.LR. 1954 Cal. 289, 
Ram Sahai v. Ram Sewak, A.LR. 
1956 All. 321, Tafammul 
Hussain v. Mst. Qaisar /agan Begam, A.LR. 1956 All. 638 and 
The Indian Trade and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Raj Mal Pahar 
Chand, A.LR. 1956 Punj. 228, overruled. 
Canada Cement Co. Ltd. v. East Montreal (Town of), (1922) l 
A.C. 249 and Nathoo Lal ''- Durga Prasad, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 51, 
distinguished. 
Per Venkatarama Ayyar /. A right of appeal was undoubtedly 
a substantive right but it did not, therefore, follow that it vested 
in the parties to a suit on and from the date of its commencement 
and the decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving 
on which such a theory was sought to be founded was neither 
supportable in principle nor warranted by the authorities it relied 
on.

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