GANGADHAR NARSINGDAS AGARWAL versus P. S. THRIVIKRAMAN & ANR.

Citation: [1972] 3 S.C.R. 874 · Decided: 16-03-1972 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.M. SIKRI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

874 
GANGADHAR NARSINGDAS AGARWAL 
v. 
P. S. THRIVIKRAMAN & ANR. 
March 16, 1972 
[S. M. S!KRI, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR 
AND M. H. BEG, JJ.] 
Tariff Act 1934-S. 44-Whether notification under S. 44 is 
appli· 
cable to the facts and circum.~tances of the case. 
The appellant on 26th July 1966 filed shipping bill in triplicate before 
the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports for the purpose of ob-
taining export licenc~s in respect of 10,160 metric tonnes of iron ore. 
On 28 July 1966 export licenee was granted to the appell'111t. 
On 30 
July 1966 the agents of the vessel made an application to the Asst!. Col-
lector of Customs, for the grant of entry outward to the said vessel to 
load i!ron ore, which was granted on the same day with pennission to 
ship cargo on board the soid vessel. 
On 1 August, the appellant presented 
to the Customs authority under section 50 of the customs Act, 1962, 
shipping bills in triplicate and the Customs authority made several en-
dorsements on the shipping bill on the sami~ day. On the 2 August 1966, 
further endorsements on the 
shipping bill was made 
by 
the Customs 
authofity indicating that the shipment was inspected, checked and payment 
was made in full. 
On 2 August 1966, ":l rrotification was issw~d by the Ministry of Com, .. 
merce imposing ;i duty at the rate of Rs. 10 per metric tonne on lumpy 
iron ore. and on 28 January 1967, the Customs authority issued a notice 
to the appellant notifying that goods actually shipped by the appellant 
were subject to '!xport duty and the appellant W":l.S liable to pay Rs. 98044 
and the appellant was called upon to show cause as to why the amount 
should not be recovered from him. 
The appellant contended that the shipping bill was presented to the 
Customs authority and the entry outward to -the ship was given prior to 
2 August, 1966 when the notification came into force and so, the notifica-
tion under S. 4A of the Tariff Act 1934 was not applicable to the consign-
ment in question. 
The Customs authorities held that the appellant was 
!\able to Jl'IY the export duty. 
The appellant impeached the order b::fore 
the Judicial Commissioner who also upheld the order of the 
Customs 
authorities. 
The only question •.vhich arose for d'!cision before this Court was 
whether the shipment and export of iron ore by the appellant became 
liable to the said duty introduced on 2 August 1966. The appellant con-
tended th1t th•" shipping bill was presented on 1 August, 1966 and the 
order of the Customs authorities for entry outw".lrds to the vessel was 
also given on 1 August 1966 and so, the export in the present case was 
not liable to payment of duty imposed on 2 August 1966. 
The Customs 
authoriti-es however contended that the ve~sel arrived at Marmagoa har-
bour on 3 August 1966 and the vessel commenced loading on 3 August, 
1966, and therefore, under s. 16(i) rif the Customs Act 1962, the shipping 
' 
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B 
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A 
B 
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G. N, AGARWAL V. P. S. RAMAN (Ray, J.) 
875 
bill which had been presented before the date of entry outwards "shall be· 
deemed to be presented at the earliest on 3 August 1966 when the vessel 
in question arrived, 
Allowing the appeal, 
HELD : Jn the present case, the Customs authorities acted withoui 
jurisdiction in impo1ing duty on the expon by holding that the date of 
entry outwmds of the vessel was the dale when the vessel, arrived. 
Section 38 of the Sea Customs Act 1878 was_the Counter-part of Sec. 16 
of the Customs Act, 1962. Section 38 h.ad two provisos. 
Under the first 
proviso to tbat oJd section where shipment was permitted without a. ship-
ping bill, the rate of duty was to be the rate in force at the time when the 
shipment of goods commenced. 
Under the second proviso, the shipping 
bill must be deemed to have been delivered on the date on which that 
vesSel arriVed or entry outWardS was ·given which ever was later. 
Under 
the provisos of S. 38 of the old Act, the Customs authorities had power 
to apply the rate in force on the date o'f the arrival of the vessel. Under 
S. 16 ·of the 19.62 Act, it is not permissible to do so. The statute does not 
contain such a provision. S. 16 of the 1962 Act speaks of the fictional date 
only in ~e_Jatiqn to the order of date of entry outwards of the veSse1. 
In 
the-present case, the order of entry outwards of the vessel v1as made prior 
to 2 August, 1966. Therefore, the Customs auti)oritJes acted without jur

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