GAJRAJ SINGH versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR.
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794 GAJRAJ SINGH v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR. March 28, 1973 [J. M. SHELAT, ACTING C.J. AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, J.] Constitution, art. 311-Madhya Bharat-Retrenchment Terms in res- pect of employees of former States merging to form new State-Em- ployees of certain categories provisionally absorbed-Could be retrenched for certain specified reason~When employee is retrenched for one or more of such reasons Art. 311 Is not attracted-Tests ar< obiectlve orul retrenchn1e11t order can be 'defended on otner grounds even if one ground falls. The appellant was in 1934 first appointed as a constable in the erst- while State of Gwalior and was promoted in 1945 to the post of Sub- lnspector. In May 1948 the rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States formed und<lr a covenant executed by them, a new State, called the United States of Madhya Bharat. The appellant was allowed to work as A B c a Sub-Inspector in the new State of Madhya Bharat but his name wa' e.1'!ered from the very beginning, that is from May 1948, in the list of D provisionally absorbed servants,' and remained so during all material times. By n notification, dated December 15, 1948, the Madhya Bharat Govern- ment published rules, called the 'Retrenchment Terms' which were revised by another notification dated July 9, 1949. In the said notification prin- ciples were laid down for the selection of Government Servants for ro· trenchment. The appellant was retrenched by an order signed by the Deputy Inspector-General, Central Range, on the ground that the appellant had a consistent bad record under re!renchment category 2 of the Re· E trenment Terms. In appeal the Inspector-General corillrmed the said order also under categories 4 and 7 of the said Terms, that is, besides the ground of a consistently bad record, also on the ground df the appellant not possessing the minimum qualification prescribed for the post, and on the ground that the appellant for reasons considered adequate by the Government, could not be absorbed in the Madhya Bharat service. The writ petition filed by the appellant challenging this order was dismissed by the High Court on the ground of delay, though Art. 311 of the Constitu- F tion was held to be attracted. In 1960 the appellant filed a suit relying on Art. 311. The trial court decreed the suit. The High Court however allowed the State'• appeal. By special leave the appellant appealed to this Court and contended: (i) that on the construction of the said Re- trenchment Terms the impugned order amounted to one of dismissal, attracting the provisions of Art. 311; and (ii) that since the ground of consistent bad record amounted to a stigma, and could not therefore be C relied on in support of the order, the order fell and could not be sustain- -. cd on the ground of lack of minimum educational qualification. Dismissing the appeal, HELD: (i) The classification of persons in the seven categories was clearly made to select persons 'from out of those who were in excess of the requirements of the new State. Since they were not to be absorbed, they could not be said to have been the employees of the new State and H Art. 311 therefore could not apply to their cases. The claim of the appellant that the impugned order amounted to punishment or that for that rc,1son Art. 311 was attracted was clearly misconceived. [SOIB] A B c D E F G H GAJRAJ V, M.P. STATE (She/at, Acting C.J.) 795 (ii) The respondent-State hild relied upon the cateaories 2, 4 and 7, as ground for the impugned order. So far as category 4 was concerned, there can be no doubt that the appellant did not have the minimum educa· tional qualification required for the post of a Sub-Inspector. Since that was so, he would also fall in cateaory No, 7, that is, as a person who could not, for reasons considered adequate by 'the Government, be ab· sorbed in the service of the new State. Eve" if therefore, category 2 could not for some reason or the other be taken into consideration, cate- gories 4 and 7 were relevant and valid. · ·;he mere fact that the Govern- ment could not avail of cateaory 2 did not mean that it could not rely on the other two grounds. The reason is that this was not a cnse of subjec- tive satisfaction, where on failure of one of the grounds it would be im- possible to predicate whether the relevant authority could have reached its satisfaction only on the basis of the rest of the grounds.
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