GAJANAN AND ORS. versus SETH BRINDABAN
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A B c D E F G H GAJANAN AND ORS. v. SETH BRINDABAN July 20, 1970 [J. M. SHELAT AND I. D. DUA, JJ.J 651 C. P. Money Lenders, Act 13 of 1934, ss. llF and llH-Act debarring carrying on o.f money lending business in any district without valid regis· tration certificate in respect of that dis1rict--Certificare held for one dis- trict-Isolated transaction in another district whether void for contraven- tion of Act-Stare Decisis-English authorities, value of. The plaintiff (respondent herein) was doing money-lending business in Yeotmal District in 'former Central Provinces (now Madhya Pradesh) and had obtained the requisite licence under the C. P. Money lenders' Act, 1934 for that district in August, 1947. The licence was regularly .re- newed thereafter. In 1947 the plaintiij gave a loan to the defendant' in Chanda District against the security of property situated in that District. In 1950 he filed a suit for foreclosure. The trial court held that since the transaction in question was in contravention of ss. llF & llH of the C. P. Money Lenders' Act the suit was not maintainable. The High Court however decided in favour of the plaintiff on the view that an isolated transaction in another district does· not come witl!in the mischief of the Act. With certificate appeal was filed in this Court. The appellant relied on the decision of the House of Lords in Cornelius v. Philip.r. HELD: (i) The case of Cornelius v. Phillips was distinguished by the Nagpur High Court in Pa ti Ram v. Baliram. The Madhya Pradesh High Court also in Janki Bai's case distinguished Cornelius v. Phillips observing that it would be unsafe to call in aid the decision relating to the interpreta· tion of s. 2 of the English Act 'for construing s. llF of the C. P. Act. The Bombay High Court in Hajarimal's case took the same view. It was correctly held in these cases that the provisions of the English Act cons- trued in Cornelius and of the C. P. Act were not completely identical. [ 665 G-ll; 666 Fl (ii) From the scheme of the Act and the definition in s. 2(v) it is evident that for a person to be a money-lender he must, in the regular course of business, advance a loan. There is a long catena of attthorities on the statutes regulating and controlling money-lenders in which the ex- pression money-lender has been so construed as to exclude isolated tran- saction or transactions of money-lending. [667 F-668 CJ (iii) Section 11 F on plain reading only prohibits the carrying on of the business of money-lending in any district without holding a valid re- gistration certificate in respect of that district. It does not prohibit and, therefore, does not invalidate an isolated transaction of lending money. Such ar. isolated transaction is outside the rigour of the prohibition. The,- fact that a registered money-lender in one district has entered into an isolated transaction of lending money in another district in which he is not registered would not make any difference in this respect and such iso- lated transaction would not be hit by the prohibitory mandate. Seotion 11 ·H ·also operates only against the suits by money-lenders on Joans ad- vanced by them and would similarly exclude from its purview a suit on an isolated transaction not entered into by a money-lender in the regular 13 Sllj!. C 1/70-13 658' SUPRLlfE COURT REPORTS [1971] 1 S.C.R. course of business. Interference with freedom of contract appears to have been limited under the Act only to the eXtcnt necessary for regulating and controlling the business of moncy·lcnJing. Section 11 C which provides for composition of offences also suggests that inUividual transactions are not considered void. The view of law taken by the Nagpur and M. P. High Courts in Patira111, llajari11ud and Jank/ Bai was thus in conformity with the statutory inten<lmcnt and must be held to be correct. [668 G· 669 DJ (iv) People in <trranging their affairs are entitled to rc·ly on decision of the highest court which appears to have prevailed for a considerable length of time and it woulJ rC'quirc san1c- exceptional reason to iustify its reversal when such reversal is likely to create serious cmbarrassn1ent for those who have acted on the faith of what 'ecmc<l to be the settled law. Where the n1eaning of the statute .is an1biguous and capable of n1orc interpretation than one, and one view ;.1ccrptcd by the higher court ha~. stood for a long period during whic
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