G.T. GIRISH versus Y. SUBBA RAJU (D) BY LRS AND ANOTHER
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A B C D E F G H 991 [2022] 8 S.C.R. 991 991 G.T. GIRISH v. Y. SUBBA RAJU (D) BY LRs AND ANOTHER (Civil Appeal No. 380 of 2022) JANUARY 18, 2022 [K. M. JOSEPH AND PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.] Specific Performance – Suit for – Maintainability – Plaint property was allotted to first defendant by Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) and a lease-cum-sale agreement was entered into between BDA and the first defendant on 04.04.1979 – On 17.11.1982, the first defendant entered into the agreement with the plaintiff agreeing to execute the sale deed of the site within three months from the date on which, the plaintiff obtained the sale deed from the BDA – Failure to execute the sale deed by first defendant – Plaintiff instituted suit seeking specific performance – Trial Court did not decree the suit for specific performance – On appeal, High Court held the suit to be maintainable and directed the defendants to execute the sale deed of plaint property in favour of plaintiff – Whether the agreement to sell dated 17.11.1982 was in the teeth of s.23 of the Contract Act and led to palpable defeat of the law in question, as contained in the Statutory Rules or prohibited by the same – Held: Case herein was governed by the Allotment of Site Rules, 1972 which were statutory Rules, and contemplated a definite scheme – Allotment to first defendant was made on 04.04.1979 and he was obliged to construct a residential building within two years under Rule 17(6) – But, at the time, agreement dated 17.11.1982 was entered into, the first defendant was already in breach – Under the agreement, the parties expressly provided that the plaintiff was to be put in possession of the site on 17.11.1982 – Clear case where enforcing the agreement, as it is, would necessarily result in the first defendant not acting in accordance with lease-cum-sale agreement, which, she entered into with the BDA and importantly, against the mandate of the law, as contained in the Rules – Agreement between the parties contemplated giving a short shrift to the mandate of the law – This is clear from the fact that under the agreement, the first defendant was obliged to sell the site as it is – A B C D E F G H 992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R. Construction of the building became a practical impossibility – The price, agreed upon, was qua the site alone – The consideration and the other terms of the agreement ruled out the possibility of a residential building being constructed by the first defendant, who as the allottee, was, under the law, obliged to construct the building – The agreement to sell involved clearly terms which were impliedly prohibited by law in that the first defendant was thereunder to deliver title to the site and prevented from acting upon the clear obligation under law – The contract / agreement was unenforceable for reason that it clearly defeated the objects of the Rules which were statutory in nature – The contract / agreement was patently illegal – High Court erred in holding the suit for specific performance to be maintainable – City of Bangalore Improvement Allotment of Site Rules, 1972. Contract Act, 1872 – s.23 – Constitution of India – Art.13 – What is contemplated u/s.23 of the Contract Act is law, in all its forms, being immunised from encroachment and infringement by a contract, being enforced – Not only would a Statutory Rule be law within the meaning of Art.13 of the Constitution but it would also be law u/s.23 of the Contract Act. Contract – A contract may expressly or impliedly, be prohibited by provisions of a law – The intentions of the parties do not salvage such a contract. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. A contract may expressly or impliedly, be prohibited by provisions of a law. The intentions of the parties do not salvage such a contract. In the instant case, the Bangalore Rules of Allotment, 1972 contemplate a definite scheme. Land, which is acquired by the Public Authority, is meant to be utilised for the particular purpose. The object of the law is to invite applications from eligible persons, who are to be selected by a Committee and the sites are allotted to those eligible persons, so that the chosen ones are enabled to put up structures, which are meant to be residential houses. It is implicit in the Rules, and what is more, in the lease-cum-sale agreement, that the allottee, who is treated as a lessee under Rule 7, will remain in possession and, what is more, proceed to fulfil his obligation under the l
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