G. RAMEGOWDA, MAJOR, ETC. versus SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, BANGALORE.

Citation: [1988] 3 S.C.R. 198 · Decided: 10-03-1988 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S. NATARAJAN · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 4 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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G. RAMEGOWDA v. S.L.A. OFFICER 
199 
Acquisition Officer granting Rs.58,000 per acre was unduly generous 
for the acquisition was just about a year after the purchase, and that the 
further enhancement by the Civil Court to Rs. r,45,200 per acre, clearly 
suffered from the vice of extreme excessiveness. 
The High Court noticed that the Government Pleader who was in 
office till JS.!2.!970 had applied for certified copies on 20.7.1970, but 
the application was allowed to be dismissed for default and that in one 
case he appeared to have taken away the certified. copy even after he 
had ceased to be a Government Pleader. After consideration of the 
matter the Division Bench of the High Court condoned the delay in the 
filing in the appeals. 
In the appeal' to this Court by the appellants-claimants it was 
contended that the High Court fell into a manifest error in condoning 
the inordinate and wholly unjustified delay and that the explanation 
offered before and accepted by the High Court cannot. in law. be held 
to constitute 'sufficient cause' for purposes and within the meaning of. 
Section S of the Limitation Act.'·· 961. The State contested the appeals. 
by contending that the High Court had heard and disposed of the appe-
als before it on the merits, substantially reducing the compensation and 
that the appellants had already preferred Special Leave Petitions 
against the final order as such, and that the appeals against .the mere 
condonation of delay do not survive at all and must be held to have 
become infructuous. It was further contended that the Government 
Pleader whom the Government had necessarily to and did trust had let 
down that trust, and there was therefore sufficient ground for the con-
donation of the delay so as to promote public interest and do substantial 
justice. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
Declining to interfere with the High Court's order and dismissing 
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"the Appeals, 
HELD: i. The fact that the main appeals are themselves, in 
the meanwhile, disposed of finally on the merits by the High Court 
would not by itself detract from aitd bar the consideration of.the .cor-
rectness of the order condoning the delays. This is an instance of what 
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are called -''dependent orders". If the order excusing the delay is itself 
set aside in these appeals, the further exercise, made in th~ meanwhile, 
by the High Court finally disposing of the appeals, would be rendered 
nugatory. [203H; 204A-B I 
2. There is no general principle saving the party from all mis-
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takes of its counsel. l20SF] 
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B 
c 
D 
200 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1988] 3 S.C.R. 
3. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its 
own special facts. [205G] 
4. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of 
bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why 
the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. [205F-G I 
5. The expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation 
Act, 1963 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substan-
tial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be 
condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deli-
berate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking 
condonation of the delay. [205G-H] 
6(i) The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for private citizen 
as for; Governmental~authorities. Government, like any other- litigant 
must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a 
somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where 
Government makes out a case where 'public interest was shown to have 
suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers 
"Or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with 
it. [206D-E] 
(ii) If appeals brought by Government are lost for such default, 
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no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, 
suffers is public interest. [206C] 
7(i)' In assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient 
cause" for purpose of Section 5 it might, perhaps be somewhat un-
realistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial 
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verdict, factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the function-
ing of the Government. fmplicit in the very nature of Governmental 
functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making 
process. [206E-H] 
, (ii) Due recognition of these limitations on Go

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