FULCHAND BHAGWANDAS GUGALE AND ANR. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
/' A B c FULCHAND BHAGWANDAS GUGALE AND ANR. V. STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. NOVEMBER 25, 2004 · [SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND B.N. SRIKRISHNA, JJ.]. Land Acquisition Act, l 894 : Sections 4 and 6 : Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966-Sections 2(31), 247 and 2~7: Agricultural Land-Acquisition-Notification u/s 4-0bjection- lnquiry uls 5A and cancellation of Notification by Sub-Division Officer- Subsequent restoration of Notification u/s 4(1) and direction for declaration u/s 6-Writ Petition-Dismissal-Application in respect of the land for D conversion for non-agricultural use-Grant of permission by Revenue Authority-Writ PetWon-Grant of permission negated by High Court-On appeal, held: Cancellation of Notification u/s 4 was incorrect and beyond 1 ·jurisdiction of the Authority concerned as it had no adjudicatory powers with regard to legality or otherwise of the Notification-Order directing E declaration u/s. 6 was also without jurisdiction and illegal-Though Sub- Divisional Officers or Collectors or Commissioners are Revenue Officers u!s 2(31) of the Code, having acted as Authorities under the Act and not F the code, cannot be said to have jurisdiction under Sections 247 and 257 of the Code-High Court also not right in interfering with the orders passed by Revenue Authorities for conversion of the land for non-agricultural use. Father of the appellants had sold a portion of Agricultural land to respondent No. 4- Committee. Thereafter respondent-Committee had submitted a proposal to Collector for acquisition of the land of the appellants. Notification u/s 4 of land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued. G Appellants filed objection to the same. Respondent 3 - Sub-Divisional Officer after holding an inquiry under Section SA of the Act held that demand for additional land was not genuine and consequently passed order canceling Notification u/s 4. Respondent-Committee filed appeal before Additional Collector (Appeals) which was dismissed. Further H appeal of the Committee was filed before respondent No. 2-Additional 412 FULCHAND BHAGWANDAS GUGALE v. STA TE 413 Commissioner. During pendency of the appeal Committee filed Writ A Petition, which was dismissed by High Court as being premature as the matter was pending before Additional Commissioner. Second respondent allowed the appeal of Committee restoring the Notification u/s 4(1) and dir~cted the Deputy Collector to submit proposal for final declaration u/s 6. Accordingly declaration u/s 6 was made. Writ Petition of appellants B challenging order of second respondent was dismissed by High Court. Hence Civil Appeal No. 6142 of 2002. Appellants had applied to the Tehsildar for permission to convert the balance land for non-agricultural use to enable them to build houses for their family members. Respondent-Committee had objected to the C same. Tehsildar granted the permission and the same was upheld by Sub-divisional Officer, Additional Collector and Additional Commissioner. Respondent-Committee filed Writ Petition and the same was allowed by High Court. Hence Civil Appeal No. 6143 of 2002. Appellants contended that order of Additional Commissioner was ; 'rithout jurisdiction; that even assuming that order of Sub-Divisional Officer cancelling Notification u/s. 4 was illegal and unlawful, it could not have been set aside by Additional Commissioner purporting to exercise power which he did not possess. D E Respondent-State contended that Collector being 'Revenue Officer' within meaning of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, its order is appealable to Divisional Commissioner u/s 247 of the Code and further such order is revisable u/s 257; that report made u/s SA by Sub-Divisional Officer was done in his capacity as a Revenue Officer so as to be F amenable to the appellate jurisdiction of the Commissioner under Section. 247 of the Code; that order of the Sub-Divisional Officer might be treated as non-est and could be ignored; that even if the order of the Additional Commissioner was illegal, there was no need no interfere with it because it had set right a wrong; that if declaration under Section 6 is set aside prejudice would be caused to the respondent-Committee G as in view of law laid down in Padma Sundra 's case the prescription of time limit in Section 6 is premptory in nature and there is no scope for stretching the period running from the date of judgment of High Court. Allowing the appeals, the Court 414
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex