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FIRM SETH RADHA KISHAN (DECEASED) REPRESENTED BY HARI KISHAN AND OTHERS versus THE, ADMINISTRATOR, MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, LUDHIANA

Citation: [1964] 2 S.C.R. 273 · Decided: 07-03-1963 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. SUBBA RAO · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

; 
2 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
273 
We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that 
the view expressed by the High Court is the correct 
view and respondent No. 1 is entitled to the benefit 
of sub-s. (2) of s. 19 read with cl. (iii) of s. 16 of the 
amending Act of 1948, provided he establishes that he 
is an agriculturist within the meaning of the princi-
pal Act. 
The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed 
with costs. 
A ppe-J l dismissed. 
FIRM SETH R ADHA KI.SHAN (DECEASED) 
REPRESENTED BY HARI KISHAN 
AND OTHERS 
v. 
THE, ADMINISTRATOR, MUNICIPAL 
COMMITTEE, LUDHIANA 
(K. SUBBA Ri1.o, RAGHUBAR DAYAL and 
J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.) 
Terminal Tax-Municipality-Collection of-Remedies by 
way of appeal provided in the Act-Expre.s or implied exclusion 
of Civil courts-Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (Pnnj. I TI of 1911), 
s.โ€ข. 61, 78, 84, 86-Punjab Government Notification No. 26443 
dated July, 21, 1932-Items 68, 69 of the Scheditle-Code of 
Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), s. 90. 
The appellant is a firm carrying on business within the 
octroi limits of Ludhiana Municipality. On the Sambhar salt 
imported by it into the limits of the Municip:ility terminal tax 
was imposed and the appellant made payment of the said tax. 
Under item 68 of the Schedule to the relevant Govtrnment 
Notificatinn the Municipality is entitled to impose a certain rate 
of tax on common salt and under item 69 it is entitled to impose 
a higher rate of tax in respect of salt of all kinds other than 
common salt. 
In the present case the higher rate was imposed. 
The appellant filed a suit against the respondent in the civil 
co11rt, Ludhina, for the refund of the amount paid by him, 
1963 
Lakshmi Achi 
v. 
T.V.V. Kailasa 
Thevar 
Das J. 
1963 
March 7 
1963 
Firm R12aha Kishan 
(Dt:tas1d) Rtflre-
stnted hJโ€ข J/11ri KiJM'I 
โ€ขโ€ข 
Administrator, .\!uniยท 
.1'pal Cornmitltt, 
Lu/Jiiana 
274 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. 
The Civil Court held that 
Sambhar salt was common salt 
~ithin the meaning of item 68, that the imposition of tax on 
it by the respondent under item 69 was illegal and that there-
fore the court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. On appe;1l 
the High Court p1oceeded on the assumption that Sambhar salt 
was common salt but held that, even so, the Civil Court had no 
jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the Act provi<led a remedy 
by way of appeal against the wrong orders of the authorities 
thereunder. The present appeal 
is by way of certificate 
granted by the High Court. 
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the 
respondent had no power to impose terminal tax on comm<ln 
salt under item 69 of the Schedule and therefore the tax having 
been imposed contrary to the provisions of the Act, the Civil 
Court has jurisdiction to entertain 
the suit. 
The contention 
on behalf of the respondent was that the respondent has power 
to impose terminal tax on comu1on salt under the provisions of 
the :\ct, that the imposition of tax under a \vrong entry could 
be rectified only in the manner P"5cribed by the Act and that 
the CivU Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for the 
refuad of the tax collected when a specific remedy is available 
under the Act. 
Held, that a statute can expressly or by necessary impliea-
tlon bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of a parti-
cular matter. 
The mere confirment of special _jurisdiction on a 
tribunal in respect of the said matter does not in itself exclude 
the jurisdiction of civil C'..ourts. The stat11te may specifically 
provide for vesting the jurisdiction of civil Courts, even if 
there was no such specific exclusion, if it creates a liability not 
existing before and gives a special and particular remedy for the 
aggrieved party, the remedy provided by it must be followed. 
The same principle would apply if the statute had provided 
for the particular forum in which the same remedy could be 
had. 
Even in sui:h cases the civil Court's jurisdiction is not 
completely ousted. i\ ~uit in a civil Court 'will ahvays lie to 
question the order of a tribunal created by a statute, even if 
it<s order is, expressly or hy necessary implication, made final, 
~
if the said tribunal abuses its power or dors l10: act 'clnder the 
1
Act but in violation uf its provision. 
ll"olt-erhamton New IJ'aterlDorl:. Co. v. Hdwkujor-1, (1859) 
G G. B. (>I. S.) 336, Secretary of State v . .llast & Co., (1940) 
L. R. 67 I. A. 222, 
Bhai-<hankar Nanabhai v. 
Municipal 
Corpo

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