FEROZE N. DOTIVALA versus P.M. WADHWANI AND ORS.

Citation: [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 416 · Decided: 03-12-2002 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.C. LAHOTI · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
FEROZE N. DOTIV ALA 
v. 
P.M. WADHWANI AND ORS. 
DECEMBER 3, 2002 
B 
[R.C. LAHOTI AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.] 
Rent Control and Eviction: 
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947; 
C Sections 54(A), 6(A), 8 and I 5(A)-'-lmporting of meaning and attribute of the 
term 'lodger' from English law to ascertain meaning of 'paying guest' already 
defined under the Act-Correctness of-Held, it is not a correct approach 
since a defined term under the Statute has its own scope and limits and there 
is no ambiguity in the definition so defined under the Act-Interpretation of 
D Statutes. 
Licensee and Paying guest-Distinction between-Discussed 
Words & Phrases: 
E 
'Paying guest'-Meaning in the context of Bombay Rent, Hotel and 
Lodging House Rates Control Act. 
Appellant was residing in a portion of the premises owned by 
respondents, on payment of certain amount as compensation, since 1969. 
In the year 1975, when respondent pressed appellant to give in writing 
F that he was in occupation of the premises as a paying guest, he did not 
accede to the request, instead filed a suit for declaring him deemed tenant 
in the said accommodation. The suit was decreed in his favour. Appeal 
filed by the respondents was dismissed. Respondent preferred writ petition. 
High Court allowed it by holding that appellant was a paying guest in the 
G premises iit dispute. Hence this appeal. 
H 
The question which arose in this appeal is about the nature of 
occupation ofthe premises in dispute by the appellant, as to whether the 
appellant is a licensee or paying guest under the provisions of the Bombay 
Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. 
416 
FEROZE N. DOTIV ALA v. P.M. WADHWANI 
417 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: I.I. In the instant case all that was required to be examined 
was the three ingredients of the term 'paying guest'. Undisputedly, the 
appellant is not a relation of the respondents. He has been given a part of 
the premises in which the licensor resides. The requirement of the term 
A 
'paying guest' as defined under the Act is fulfilled. 1423-E-FI 
B 
1.2. The paying guest enjoys the possession exclusively and separately 
is not material so long the premises in his occupation is a part of the larger 
premises in which licensor resides. Basically the premises u.nder 
consideration is one terrace flat and with only one eetrance, a part of C 
which has been given to the appellant by the licensor who occupies the 
remaining part of the whole terrace flat. The finding to the effect that the 
part given to the appellant is in his exclusive and separate use would be 
of no consequence so long it is a part of the whole premises. 
(423-F, G; 424-Dj 
2.1. The appellate Court has specifically considered the meaning of 
the expression 'paying guest' as under the English Law considering the 
meaning of the word "lodger". It may not be wise to import the meaning 
a11d attributes of the term "lodger" as prevalent under the English law to 
asrertain the meaning of"paying guest" which is specifically defined under 
D 
the Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. It is not E 
possible to add to what has been already defined by the Legislature for 
the purposes of a particular enactment dealing with a particular kind of 
situation it envisages to meet. 1422-H; 423-A-Cj 
2.2. A defined term under a particular statute has its own scope and 
limits. Even two similar terms may not mean the same thing if defined in 
two different enactments in their own context. The meaning of the word 
"paying guest" depending upon the ingredients of unity of residence and 
control or dominion over the premises given, as relevant for the purposes 
F 
of 'lodger' under the English law was not a correct approach. More so, 
when there is no ambiguity in the definition of 'paying guest' as defined G 
under the Act. The Legislature, while defining a word or a term, is fully 
competent even to assign an artificial meaning to the word. 1423-C-El 
Kishan Lal v. State of Rajaslhan, AIR (1990) SC 2269 and P. 
K'.lsilingam and Ors. v. P.S.G. College of Technology and Ors., AIR (1995) 
SC 1395, relied on. 
H 
418 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 
A 
Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Joiner, (1975) 3 All England Law 
Reports 1050 (HL), referred to. 
2.3. Meaning of a restrictive and exhaustive definition would not be 
expanded or made extensive to embrace things which are strictly not 
within the meaning o

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