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FAZLUL RABBI PRADHAN versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL

Citation: [1965] 3 S.C.R. 307 · Decided: 08-03-1965 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
FAZLUL RABBI PRADHAN 
v. 
STATE OF WEST BENGAL 
March 8, 1965 
SQ7 
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, CJ., M. H!DAYA,TULLAH, J. c. SHAH AND 
B 
S. M. SIKRI, JJ.] 
West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1954), s. 6(l)(i)-
"Cliaritab!e purpose", meaning of. 
The appellants were the respective mutawallis of two wakfs, in 
which either the ultimate benefit to the charity was postponed till 
after the exhaustion of the wakif's family and descenden ts, or the 
C 
income from the wakf estate was applied for the maintenance of the 
family side by side with expenditure for charitable or religious pur-
poses. Notices were issued by the Collector under the West Bengal 
. Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, to the appellants, calling upon them to 
hand over possession of the wakf estates, on the ground that under 
s. 4 of the Act, there was an extinction and cesser of the estate and the 
rights of the appellants, and that their divested estates and rights 
vested in the State. The appellants claimed that they were protected 
D 
by s. 6(l)(i) of the Act, because, they were holding the properties 
exclusively for purposes which were charitable or religious or both. 
The claim was rejected by the Collector, by the Commissioner on 
appeal, and by the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 
Iii the appeal to the Supreme Court, 
HELD: The purposes described in the deeds were not covered by 
E 
the expression "religious purpose'', and they were not exclusively for 
charitable purposes. Mingled with those purposes were some which 
were secular and some, which were family endowments, of a very 
substantial character. As the provisions about the family had not 
become inoperative by the exhaustion of the beneficiaries, the deeds, 
as they stood, could not be said to come within exemption claimed. 
[317 F-H]. 
• 
F 
The provisions of the Act apply notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary contained in any other law or in any instrument and not-
withstanding any usage or custom to the contrary. The Act must, 
therefore, be construed on its actual words and the exemption cannot 
be enlarged beyond what is granted there. No doubt, the definition of 
"Charitable purpose" is not· exhaustive like that of "religious pur-
pose" but the expression "public utility" in the definition of "chari-
table purpose" gives a guidance to the meaning and purpose of the 
G 
exemption. It leaves scope for addition but it does not make for en-
largement in directions which cannot be described as "charitable". Al 
provision for the family of the wakif or for himself cannot be regarde~ 
as "relief of poor", "medical relief" or "the advancement of educa-
tion" under the definition. It cannot also be regarded as an expendi· 
ture on an object of general public utility. It is true that after the 
H 
passing of the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913 and the Shariat 
Act, 1937, wakfs, in which the object was the aggrandisement of th!! 
families of wakifs without any pretence of charity in the ordinary 
sense, became valid and operative. But, the intention was not to give 
a new meaning to the word "Charity" which in common parlance is 
a word denoting a giving to someone in necessitous circumstances and 
in law, a giving for public good. A private gift to one's own self or 
kith and kin may be meritorious and pious, but is not a charity in the 
legal sense and Courts in India have never regarded such gifts as for 
religious or charitable purposes, even under the Mahomedan Law. 
(313 B, H; 314 A; 316 F-H; 317 D]. 
1,1 B(N;SSOI-7 
308 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1\165] 3 s.c.R. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 392 and 
A 
393 of 1964. 
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated 
March 26, 1962, of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Revision Nos. 
3176 of 1958. 
G. S. Chatterjee and S. C. Mazumdar, for the appellant (in 
B 
C.A. No .. 392/64). 
N. C. Chatterjee and S. C. Mazumdar, for the appellant (in 
C.A. No. 393/64). 
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, B. Sen, S. C. Bose and 
P. K. Bose, for the respondents (in C.A. 392/ 64). 
C 
B: Sen, S. C. Bose and P. K. Bose, for the respondent (in C.A. 
No. 393/64). . 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
Hidayatullah, J. 
In these two appeals the appellants seek to 
displace a common judgment and order of the High Court of Cal-
cutta dated March 26, 1962 by which a Full Bench of the Court, 
specially constituted to hear and determine certain petitions under 
Art. 226 of the Constitution invol

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