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FATEHJI & COMPANY & ANR. versus L.M. NAGPAL & ORS.

Citation: [2015] 6 S.C.R. 389 · Decided: 24-04-2015 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V. GOPALA GOWDA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2015] 6 S.C.R. 389 
FATEHJI & COMPANY & ANR. 
v. 
L.M. NAGPAL & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No.3912 Of 2015) 
APRIL 24, 2015 
A 
B 
[V. GOPALA GOWDA AND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.] 
Limitation Act, 1963 - Art. 54 -
Suit for specific 
performance of contract- Limitation period- Suit for specific c 
performance of sale agreement filed by the plaintiffs on 
29. 4. 1994 against the defendants - Performance of contract 
was fixed till 2. 12. 73, however, by subsequent letters 
defendants sought extension of time till 1.2.1977 -
Application u/Or. VII r. 11 seeking rejection of the plaint as D 
barred by limitation - Trial court held that the suit was barred 
by limitation - However High Court set aside the order of 
the trial court - On appeal, held: Last extension sought for 
by the defendants expired on 1. 2.1977 - Suit seeking specific 
performance was filed much beyond the period of three years E 
- On facts, averment by the plaintiff that the last and final 
cause of action accrued and arose to them after 1991 when 
the defendants succeeded in hiding themselves and started 
avoiding the plaintiffs, cannot be accepted - Thus, the order 
passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the trial F 
court is restored- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. VII r. 
11. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 The fact that the plaintiffs were put in G 
possession of the property agreed to be sold on the date 
of agreement itself would not make any difference with 
regard to the limitation of filing the suit for specific 
performance. In fact both the courts below rightly held 
that Article 54 of the Limitation Act does not make any H 
389 
390 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
f2015] 6 S.C.R. 
A difference between a case where possession of the 
property has been delivered in part performance of the 
agreement or otherwise. In the same way the courts 
below concurrently held even if any permission is to be 
obtained prior to the performance/completion of the 
B contract, the mere fact that the defendants have not 
obtained the said permission would not lead to inference 
that no cause of action for filing the suit for specific 
performance would arise. Further it is also not the case 
for postponing the performance to a future date without 
C fixing any further date for performance. [Para 7) [394-E-
H; 395-A] 
1.2 The plaintiffs averred in the plaint that the last 
and final cause of action accrued and arose to them after 
D 1991 when the defendants succeeded in hiding 
themselves and started avoiding the plaintiffs and the 
cause of action being recurring and continuous one, they 
filed the suit on 29.4.1994. The original cause of action 
E became available to the plaintiffs on 2.12.1973 the date 
fixed for the performance of the contract and thereafter, 
the same stood exter.ded till 1.2.1977. Though the 
plaintiffs claimed that oral extension of time was given, 
no particulars as to when and how long, were not 
F mentioned in the plaint. The suit for specific performance 
was filed by the plaintiffs on 29.4.1994, much beyond 
the period of three years. On the other hand even after 
knowing the dishonest intention of the sons of the 
second defendant with regard to the suit property in the 
G year 1985, the plaintiffs did not file the suit immediately. 
The suit having been filed in the year 1994 is barred by 
limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act. The High 
Court erred in reversing the well considered order of 
H the trial court rejecting the plaint as barred by limitation 
FATEHJI & COMPANY & ANR. v. L.M. NAGPAL & ORS. 391 
and the impugned judgment is set aside. [Para 9, 1 O] 
A 
[395-D-H; 396-A] 
Ahmadsahab Abdul Mui/a (2) (Dead) by proposed Lrs. ยท 8 
vs. Bibijan and ors. 2009 (5) SCR 476 : (2009)5 SCC 462; 
Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable 
Society represented by its Chairman vs. Ponniamman 
Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing 
Trustee 2012 (6) SCR 404 : (2012) 8 SCC 706; S. c 
ยท Brahmanand and ors. vs. K.R. Muthugopal (Dead) and ors. 
2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 461: (2005) 12 SCC 764; Panchanan 
Ohara and ors. vs. Monmatha Nath Maity (Dead) through 
Lrs. and Anr. 2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 520: (2006) 5 SCC 340; 
Nitanjan Kumar and ors. vs. Dhyan Singh and Anr. (1976) 4 D 
sec 89 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
2009 (5) SCR 476 
Referred to. 
Para 5 
2012 (6) SCR 404 
Referred to. 
Para 5 
E 
2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 461 Referred to. 
Para 5 
2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 520 Referred to. 
Para 5 
(1976)

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