LexFATEH BIBI ETC. versus CHARAN DASS
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B
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FATEH BIBI ETC.
v.
CHARAN DASS
March IO, 1970
953
(S. M. SIKRI, V. BHARGAVA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]
Hindu Law of Inheritance, (Amendment) Act, 1929 (Act 2 of 1929)-
Act wheth~r applies in case of Hindu male dying in-estate before thei
Act came into operation and succeeded by female heir dying after that
dc .. te-Succession tp estate of last male owner when opens.
K's son C died in 1925 and was succeeded in the ownership of his
properties (inherited from K) by his mother B.
B continued in possession
till her death in 1946.
Her daughter M took possession of the properties
as heir.
M died in 1950.
The respondent-plaintiff was the son of M.
In
1955 he filed a suit alleging that the defendant, after the death of B
claiming to be entitled to the properties as a collateral and revisioner of
K, had got mutation of the aforesaid properties effected in his name.
As
daughter's son of K the respondent-plaintiff prayed for declaration of his
title to the suit properties; he also prayed for recovery of pos:tession thei'e~
of from the defendant.
The defendant contended that he wa. a collateral
.of K and was entitled to succeed to the properties after the termination
of the life-estate of his widow B on her death in 1946. The trial court
held that in view of the provisions of the Hindu
Law of Inheritance
(Amendment) Act 1929 (Act 2 of 1929) the plaintiff as sisters' son of
C the last male holder, had a preferential claim to that of the defendant
who was only a paternal uncle of C.
The first appellate Court upheld
the decree of the trial Court.
In second appeal by the defendant before
the High Court the learned Single Judge held that as C the last male
owner had died in 1925 his heirs must be found on that date.
On that
date according to the learned Judge the heir of C was the defendant. The
fact that the life.estate of the mother and sister of C intervened after his
death would not affect the rights of the defendant as the Act of 1929, had
no retrospe~tive operation.
In Letters Patent Appe~I the Division Bench
reversed the judgment of the Single Judge. The, legal representatives of
the· defendant appealed to this Court by certificate. The question of Jaw
that fell for consideration was whether the Act applies only to the case
of a Hindu male dying intestate on or. after February 21, 1929 when the
Act came into force or whether it also applies to the case of a Hindu male
dying intestate before the Act came into operation and succeeded by a
female heir who died after that date,
It was not disputed that C held
the pfoperty absolutely and he died intestate.
HELD: Applying the rule laid down hy the Judicial Commi.tte~ of the
Privy Council in Lala D1111i Chand'.\· case the appeal must be d1sn11ssed.
The point of time for the applicability of the Act is when the succes-
sion opens ri:;,,. v,ihen the life estate terminates.
In consequence the qucs·
tion as to who is the nearest revcrsionarv heir. or \Vhat is the class of
reversionary heirs \'.'ill fall to he settled at the date of the expirv of the
ownerS:hip for life or lives.
Th~ dc·ath of a
flindu fen1alc
life-estate
owner oocns the inheritance to the rcvcrsioncrs and the one n1ost nearly
related <it the tin1C to the last full l'\Vncr hccon1cs entitled to the estate.
!961 E]
LI JS1pCl(NP )70-16
954
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
The Act accordingly must be held to apply to the case oi a Hindu
male dying intestate before the Act came into operation and succeeded
by a female heir who died after that date. In this case as decided by all
the Courts the last female heir died only- on March 25; 1950 and, under
the Act, the plaintiff as the sister's son of C, was entitled to succeed to
his estate, in prefe{'ence to the defendant who was only a paternal uncle.
Under the Act the paternal uncle is postponed to
the
four
relations
referred to in the Act, the last of whom is the sister's son. [961 GJ
A
B
It may also be stated, though the question was not
raised
by
the
parties, that in this case the succession can be considered to have opened
even in 1946 on the termination of the life-estate of C's mother and
accordingly C's sister must be considered to have succeeded to the property
of her brother, in her own right as a preferential heir under the Act,
though the estate taken by her was also under s. 3 (b) only a life estate.
~61ffi
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