LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
⚖️ Ask the AI about your situation:🚗 Car Accident💼 Work / Job🏠 Housing / Eviction👪 Family / Divorce📋 Contract Dispute💰 Money Owed

FAIRGROWTH INVESTMENTS LTD. versus THE CUSTODIAN

Citation: [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 505 · Decided: 14-10-2004 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: RUMA PAL · Disposal: Dismissed

cites 3 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

FAIRGROWTH INVESTMENTS LTD. 
A 
v. 
THE CUSTODIAN 
OCTOBER 14, 2004 
[RUMA PAL AND ARUN KUMAR, JJ.] 
B 
Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) 
Act, 1992/Limitation Act, 1963-Section 4(2)/ Sections 5 and 29(2)-Petition 
u/s 4(2)-Beyond the limitation period-Condonation of delay-Permissibility 
of-Held: The delay in filing the petition cannot be condoned-The limitation C 
period is mandatory-The provision for condoning delay is not provided in 
the statute, nor can it be condoned u/s 5 of Limitation Act by virtue of 
applicability of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act-Section 29(2) does not 
apply to the statute as the statute had excluded application of Limitation Act. 
Judicial Propriety-Judicial pronouncement-Two views-One by D 
Division Bench another by larger Bench-Held: Reliance should be placed 
on the view expressed b; 1 larger Bench-Precedent. 
Words and Phrases: 
'Exclusion '-Meaning of 
E 
Appellant was notified u/s 3(2) of Special Courts (Trial of Offences 
Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992. Appellant filed petifon of 
objection to the notification u/s 4(2) of the Act, but beyond the period of 
limitation prescribed under the Section. Special Court rejected the same on 
the ground of limitation. 
F 
In appeal to this Court appellant contended that the notified person could 
not be deprived of the right merely on the ground of limitation; that provision 
prescribing a period of limitation in Section 4(2) was directory and not 
mandatory; that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would automa!ically 
be applicable to all Special Acts; that the provisions of Limitation Act had not G 
been excluded either expressly or by necessary implication; that by virtue of 
applicability of Section 29(2), Section 5 of Limitation Act would be applicable 
to the petitions u/s 4(2) of the Act and hence the delay could be condoned 
thereunder. 
505 
H 
506 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 
A 
Respondent-Custodian contended that period of limitation prescribed u/ 
u/s 4(2) could not be said to be merely directory; that Section 29(2) of 
Limitation Act would have no application to the Act; and that conferment of 
power to condone delay provided expressly in connection with appeal u/s 10 of 
the Act, necessarily implied the exclusion of such power in the Court u/s 
B 4(2). 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. Since the appellant's petition of objection had been filed 
much beyond the period prescribed under Section 4(2) of Special Courts {Trial 
C of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, the Special 
Court was right in rejecting the petition in limine. [Sl9-B] 
D 
E 
L.S. Synthetics Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd and Anr., 
(2004) 7 SCALE 427 and Hukumdev Narayan Yadav v. L.N. Mishra, (1974) 2 
sec 133, relied on. 
1.2 The period for filing a~ objection under Section 4(2) is a mandatory 
provision given the language of the Section and having regard to the objects 
sought to be served by the Act. The period prescribed cannot be extended by 
the Court under any inherent jurisdiction of the Special Court. 
[Sl2-C; SIS-CJ 
Dr. J.J. Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi, (2002) 6 SCC 63S, followed. 
Topline Shoes Ltd v. Corporation Bank, [2002) 2 SCC 33, referred to. 
1.3. The mere use of the word "may" in Sections 4(2) of the Act does 
F not indicate that the period prescribed under the Section is merely directory. 
The word 'may' merely enables or empowers the objector to file an objection. 
[SI3-A-BI 
Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, [1976) I SCC 392, 
relied on. 
G 
1.4. The words of Section 4(2) are unequivocal and unqualified and there 
is no scope for reading in a power of Court to dispense with the time limit on 
the basis of any principle of interpretation of statutory provisions. [Sl2-F) 
R. Rudraiah v. State of Karnataka, [1998[ 3 SCC 23, relied on. 
H 
l.S. It is not for the Courts to determine whether the period of30 days 
,,.. 
FAIRGROWTH INVESTMENTS LTD. v. THE CUSTODIAN 
507 
is too short to take into account the various misfortunes that may be faced by A 
notified persons who wish to file objections under Section 4(2) of the Act nor 
can the Section be held to be directory because of such alleged inadequacy of 
time. (513-G) 
Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah Bhurey Lal Baya, [1955] 2 
SCR 1 and Syndicate Bank v. Prabha D. Naik and Anr., (20011 4 SCC 713 B 
and C. Beepathumma and Ors. v. Kudambalit

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.