LexEXECUTIVE ENGINEER, ROAD DEVELOPMENT DIVISION NO.ILL, PANVEL & ANR. versus ATLANTA LIMITED
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[2014] 1 S.C.R. 507 EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, ROAD DEVELOPMENT DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL & ANR. V. ATLANTA LIMITED (Civil Appeal No. 673 of 2014) JANUARY 16, 2014 [A.K. PATNAIK AND JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.] A B Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: ss.2(1)(e), 42 - Jurisdiction to determine the controversy emerging out of the C award of the arbitral tribunal - Division of litigation between High Court exercising 'ordinary original civil jurisdiction' and the 'Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction' in a District - Held: s.42 mandates, that the court wherein the first application arising out of such a challenge is filed, shall alone D have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute(s), which are filed later in point of time - This legislative intent must also be understood as mandating, that disputes arising out of the same arbitration agreement, arbitral proceeding or arbitral award, would not be adjudicated upon by more than E one court, even though jurisdiction to raise such disputes may legitimately lie before two or more courts - s.42 is not of any assistance in the instant case as the challenge was made in different court on the same day - In view of facts and circumstances of the case, reliance placed on ss. 15 and 16 F CPC was a/so misplaced - By virtue of s.2(1)(e), if choice is between the High Court (in exercise of its "ordinary original civil jurisdiction'? on the one hand, and the "principal civil court of original jurisdiction" in the District i.e. the District Judge on the other, choice is made in favour of the High G Court - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - ss.15, 16. ,. A contract was awarded on 12.07 .2007 by the respondent-State to the respondent for the construction 507 H 508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R. A of Mumbra Byepass. Dispute arose between the parties and matter was referred to arbitration and an award was passed on 12.5.2012.0n 7 .8.2012, the respondent as also the appellant both questioned the award of the arbitral tribunal. While the appellant questioned the same 8 before the District Judge, Thane, the respondent filed Arbitration Petition before the High Court for setting aside some of the directions issued by the arbitral tribunal in its award dated 12.5.2012. Since the same award was subject matter of C challenge before the two different courts, the respondent prayed for transfer of the applications filed by appellant before the District Court to the original side of the High Court for being heard along with its Arbitration Petition. D The High Court while noticing that the State-appellant had not raised objection as to consolidation of the proceedings so as to avoid conflicting decisions or simultaneous trial held that since Arbitration Petition has already been placed before the Single Judge, it is proper E if proceedings before the District Court, Thane are brought and are heard along with the Arbitration Petition. The said order has been challenged in the instant appeal. The appellants had placed reliance on Section 2(1 )(e) of the Arbitration Act read with the provisions of Code of F Civil Procedure to contend, that the District Judge, Thane, alone would have the jurisdiction in the matter. Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The appellants had in the reply affidavit filed G before the High Court, clearly acknowledged the legal position, that both the High Court as also the District Judge, Thane, in so far as the instant controversy is concerned, fall within the definition of the term "Court" under Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act. The High H Court in impugned expressly noticed that it was admitted EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL 509 v. ATLANTA LTD. by the rival parties that the High Court on the original A side, as also the District Judge, Thane, had the jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter. It was, therefore, not open to the appellants to canvass that the High Court of Bombay in exercise of its "ordinary original civil jurisdiction" could not adjudicate upon the instant B controversy, on account of lack of jurisdiction. [Paras 12 and 13] (525-C-D & G-H; 526-D] Bharat Aluminium Company and Ors. vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc and Ors. (2012) 9 SCC 559 C - referred to. 2. In terms of the mandate of Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the initiation of action within the jurisdiction of Greater Mumbai had to be "in t
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