LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
⚖️ Ask the AI about your situation:🚗 Car Accident💼 Work / Job🏠 Housing / Eviction👪 Family / Divorce📋 Contract Dispute💰 Money Owed

EVEREST APARTMENTS CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

Citation: [1966] 3 S.C.R. 365 · Decided: 18-01-1966 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. SUBBA RAO · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

r 
' 
A 
EVEREST APARTMENTS CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING 
B 
c 
.D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SOCIETY LTD. 
v. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. 
January 18, 1966 
[K. SUBBA RAO, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND R. S. BACHAWAT JJ.j 
Maharashtra Co--0perative Societies Act, 1960 (24 of 1961), ss. 23(2), 
154-0rders of Deputy Registrar under s. 23(2)-Whether final-State 
Government whether has revisional jurisdiction over 'then1 under s. 154-
Parties whether can invoke revisional jurisdiction. 
The appellant was a registered co-operative Housing Society, regi& 
tered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. 
S, res-
pondent no. 4, applied for membership of the society but this 
was 
retu.ed. He appealed under s. 23(2) of the Act to the Deputy Registrar· 
Co-operative Societies who decided in bjs favour. 
The appellant filed 
an application before the State Government for revision purporting to be 
under s. 154 of the Act which was rejected on the ground that Govern-
ment bad no revisional jurisdiction against orders under s. 23(3). The 
appellant then went to the High C.Ourt under Arts. 226 and 227 and 
failing there also came to this Court by special leave. The questions 
that fell to be decided were. (i) Is the finality under s. 23(3) subject to 
s. 154 and (ii) Has a party a right to move the State Government under 
•. 154? 
HELD : (i) There is no doubt that s. 154 is potential but not com-
pulsive. Power is reposed in Government to intervene to do justice when 
occasion demands it and of the occasion for its exercise Government is 
made sole judge. This power can be exercised in all cases except in a 
case in which a similar power has already been exercised by the Tribunal 
under s. 149(9) of the Act. 
The exception was considered necessary 
because the legality or propriety of an order having been considered once,. 
it would be an act of superetogation to consider the matter twice. 
It 
follows, thetefore, that Government can exercise its powers under s. 154 
in all cases with one exception only, and that the finality of the order 
under s. 23(3) does not restrict the exercise of the power. The word 
•final' in this context means that the order is not subject to an ordinary 
appeal or revision but it does not touch the special power legislatively 
conferred on Government. The Government was in error in considering 
that .it had no jurisdiction in this case for it obviously had. [371 B-DJ 
Conunissioner of Income-tax West Punjab v. The Trii.J-ruze Trust, Lahore, 
( 1948) 16 l.T.R. 214 (P.C.) and Sheffield Corporation v. Luxford, [1929] 
2 K.B. 180, refecred to. 
(ii) The fact that s. 154 does not expressly permit a party to invoke 
the revision jurisdiction under that section does not mean that a party 
is prohibited from moving the Government. 
But as Government is not 
compelled to take action, unless it thinks fit the party who moves the 
Government cannot claim that he has a right of appeal or revision. 
On 
the other hand Government should welcome such applications because they 
draw its attention to cases in some of which it may be interested to 
intervene. [371 FJ 
366 . 
SUPREME COUllT REPORTS 
I 1966] 3 S.C.R. 
Sheffield Corporation v. Lu.tford, (1929] 2 K.B. 180, distinguished. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. I of 1966. 
Appeal by special leave from the order dated June 30, 1965 of 
the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1027 of 
1965. 
S. V. G11p1e, Solici1or-Cie11eral and N. N. Keswani, for the ap-
pellant. 
JViren De, Additional So/icitor-Ge11eral and B. R. G. K. Achar, 
for respondent No. I. 
The judgment of the Court was delivered by 
Hidayatullab, J, In this appeal by special leave we are not 
concerned with the merits of the controversy between the appellant 
and the fourth respondent, who are the contesting parties, because 
bnly two short questions of law arise for our decision. The appe-
llant is a registered co-operative Housing Society, registered under 
the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (XXIV of 1961 ). 
The Society was prori1oted by two individuals for the construction 
of a block of flats in Bombay. Shivdasani (respodent 4) claims to 
we paid the entrance fee, share money and other demands and 
cilmplaints that his membership was wrongly rejected by the Society. 
The Society denies these statements and the claim. 
We arc not 
concerned with the details of this dispute. 
What we are concerned 
with is this: On being informed of the rejection of his application 
for mem

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.