ESHA BHATTACHARJEE versus MANAGING COMMITTEE OF RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY AND OTHERS

Citation: [2013] 9 S.C.R. 782 · Decided: 13-09-2013 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ANIL R. DAVE · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 7 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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[2013] 9 S.C.R. 782 
ESHA BHATTACHARJEE 
V. 
MANAGING COMMITTEE OF RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR 
ACADEMY AND OTHERS 
(Civil Appeal No. 8183-8184 of 2013) 
SEPTEMBER 13, 2013. 
[ANIL R. DAVE AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.) 
Delay IL aches: 
Appeal against interim order filed belatedly - Prayer to 
condone 2449 days delay - Allowed by Division Bench of 
High Court - Principles as regards condonation of delay 
culled out - Additional guidelines laid down - Held: Rules of 
D limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties --
They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory 
tactics but seek their remedy promptly -- Every legal remedy 
must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time --
Order passed by Division Bench of High Court condoning the 
E delay is set aside - Appeal. 
Education/Educational Institutions: 
Managing committee of school - Non-compliance of 
court's order - Inordinate delay in filing appeal - Held: The 
F persons who are nominated or inducted as members or 
chosen as Secretaries of the managing committees of 
schools are required to behave with responsibility and not to 
adopt a casual approach -- A statutory committee cannot 
remain totally indifferent to an order passed by court. 
G 
H 
The appellant, an Assistant Teacher in language 
group (Bengali), filed a writ petition seeking approval of 
her appointment and for certain other reliefs. The single 
Judge of the High Court, on 25.2.2004, issued a direction 
782 
ESHA BHATTACHARJEE v. MANAGING COMMIT. OF 
783 
RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY 
that during the pendency of the application, the services 
A 
of the petitioner as Assistant Teacher in Bengali should 
not be disturbed. As the said order was not complied 
with, the appellant filed a contempt application. An 
undertaking was given before the single Judge and 
accordingly the contempt petition was disposed of. 
B 
However, as the appellant was not allowed to join her 
duty, she preferred another contempt petition. 
Consequent upon the High Court's direction, she was 
allowed to join, but was neither permitted to sign the daily 
attendance register, nor allotted any work nor was she c 
paid the salary. She filed yet another contempt petition 
and on 24.12.2010 the single Judge directed for personal 
presence of the Secretary and teacher-in-charge of the 
school. The Managing Committee and the Secretary of 
the school then preferred an appeal along with an 
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application for condonation of delay, challenging the 
interim order dated 25.2.2004; and the Division Bench of 
the High Court condoned the delay and also passed an 
interim order of stay. 
In the instant appeals, the question for consideration 
E 
before the Court was: whether the Division Bench of the 
High Court was justified in entertaining the application for 
condoning of 2449 days delay in filing the appeal against 
the interim order dated 25.2.2004; passed by the single 
Judge in the writ petition. 
F 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. As regards condonation of delay, from the 
enunciation of law in the judgments of this Court, the 
principles that can broadly be culled out are: 
G 
(i) 
There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing 
with an application for condonation of delay, 
for the courts are not supposed to legalise 
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F 
G 
784 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2013] 9 S.C.R. 
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 
(ii) 
The term "sufficient cause" should be 
understood in its proper spirit, philosophy and 
purpose regard being had to the fact that the 
term is basically elastic and is to be applied in 
proper perspective to the obtaining fact-
situation. 
(iii) 
Substantial justice being paramount and 
pivotal the technical considerations should 
not be given undue and uncalled for 
emphasis. 
(iv) 
No presumption can be attached to deliberate 
causation of delay but, gross negligence on 
the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken 
note of. 
(v) 
Lack of bona tides imputable to a party 
seeking condonation of delay is a significant 
and relevant fact. 
(vi) 
It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict 
proof should not affect public justice and 
cause public mischief because the courts are 
required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate 
eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 
(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to 
encapsule the conception of reasonableness 
and it cannot be allowed a totally unfett

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