LexEPARI CHINNA KRISHNA MOORTHY PROPRIETOR, EPARI CHINNA MOORTHY AND SONS, BERHAMPUR, ORISSA versus STATE OF ORISSA
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
', 7 S.C.R. SUPREJ\lE COURT REPORTS 185 EPARI CHINNA KRISHNA MOORTHY. PROPRIETOR, EPARI CHINNA MOORTHY AND SONS, BERHAMPUR. ORISSA v. STATE OF ORISSA (With Connected Petition) [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c J,, K N. WANCHOO, J, c. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S, M. S!KRI, JJJ Fundamental Rights-Notification by Government exempt- ing certain articles from sales tax-Petitioner claiming exemp- tion under the notification-Validation Ac.t coming into force- Retrospective operation-Validity-Enactment, if unconstitu- tional-Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, (14 of 1947), s. 6-Sales Tax Validation Act, 1961 (7 of 1961) s, 2-Cor.s:titution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1)(g). The petitioner, a merchant, carrying on business in. "bul- lion and specie'' and gold and silver ornaments was a registered 'dealer' under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, The Government purporting to exercise its authority under s. 6 of the said Act issued a notification on July 1, 1949 exempting certain articles from the operation of the charging section of that Act. Under the notification gold ornaments were ordered to be exempted from sales tax when the manufacturer selling ·them charges separately for the value of gold and the cost of manufacture. The petitioner filed his returns before the Sales-tax Officer and claimed exemption of sales-tax under the said notification, Up to June 1952, the claim for exemption was upheld. Subsequently, however, these assessments were reopened under s. 12(7) of the Act and it was claimed tha.t the deductions made on certain sale transactions of gold ornaments were not justified and the peti- tioner had escaped assessment. The petitioner pleaded that he was entitled to exemption, because he belonged to the class of manufacturers to which the notification referred. The Sales-tax Officer disallowed the petitioner's contention, The petitioner then challenged the said decision by preferring appeals, but the said appeals were also dismissed. Pending these appeals, similar assessments made in respect of other dealers including the petitioner were challenged by writ petitions before the High Court, The High Court upheld the petitioner's case and issued writs directing the Sales-tax Officer to allow the petitioners' claim for exemption, After this judge- ment was pronounced, the impugned Act was passed by the legislature on August 1, 1961 and was published on Septem- ber 18, 1961, containing one operative provision in s, 2, It pro- vided that notwithstanding anything contained in any judge- ment, decree or order of any court, the word 'manufacturer' oc- curing against item 33 in the schedule . to the notification of the Government dated July 28, 1947 as amended by another noti- fication of the 1st July, 1949 shall mean and shall always be deemed to have meant a person who by his own Jabour works up materials into suita.ble forms and a person who owns or runs a manufactory for the PUI1lose of business with respect to the articles manufactured therem, The validity cf this section was challenged m the present writ petition, 1964 Jlard. n 186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] 1964 It was urged (i) that since the \xemption was granted by the State Government by virtue of the powers conferred on it Epari Ohinna by s. 6, it was not open to the legislature to take away that Kriakna Moorthy, h Proprietor, Epari exemption retrospectively; (ii) t at the provision in s. 2 of the <Jhinna Jfoorthy .i. impugned Act was discriminatory and as such contravened the SOM, B"hampur, equallty before the law guaranteed by Art. 14 and (iii) that Oris.~a the retrospective operation of the impugned section sh6uld be v. struck down as unconstitutional, because it imposes an unreason- Sta!e- 01 Orissa able restriction on the petitioner's fundamental right under Art. <Jajendragadkar, O.J.19 (1) (g) · He!d: (i) What the legislature had purported to do. by s. 2 of the impugned Act, was to make the intention of the notifica- tion clear. And, if the State Government was given the power either to grant or withdraw the exemption, that could not pos- sibly affect the legislature's competence to make any provision in that behalf either prospectively or retrospectively. (ii) The notification as interpreted by s. 2 of the impugned Act benefits the artisans who produce ornaments thems.,lves and who run manufactories. That is why the main object of granting exemption can be said to be achieved by holding that 'ma
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.