LexEARABHADRAPPA ALIAS KRISHNAPPA versus STATE OF KARNATAKA
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
552
A
B
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EARABHADRAPPA ALIAS KRISHNAPPA
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
March 11, 1983
(A.P. SEN AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.j
A. Evidence-Circumstantial evi<Jence-Nature oi proof requiid for
conclusion of guilt and conviction.
B.
Indian Evidence Act-Section l71 conditions pre-requistite, therefor-
' Fact' and "Fact discovered" explained.
C. Presumption under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act-Nature
of presumption under illustration (a) explained.
D
D. Sentencing and duty of the Court in appropriate cases of conviction-
E
F
lnterference with sentence in criminal appeal by the Sup,veme
Court-Binding nature of Article 141 of the Constitution.
The appellant, Earabhadrappa hailing from- village Mattakur, under the
false name of Krishnappa and with a false address obtained employment of
service as a domestic servant under PW 3 Makrappa; the husband of the
deceased Bacharruna, who was found murdered by strangulation on the night
between March 21-22, 1979 after having been robbed of her jewellery, clothes,
etc. Based on circumstantial evidence, the appellant, who was found mis-
sing right from the early hours of the 22nd March, 1979 and who was apprehend-
ed a ·year later on March 29, 1980, was charged with and convicted for the
offences under Sections 302, 392 IPC respectively. He was sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a term of 10 years under section 392 IPC and to
death under Section 302. In appeal, the High Court confirmed both the con-
viction and sentences imposed upon him. Hence the appeal by-.special leave.
Dismissing the appeal and modifying the sentence, the Court.
HELD: 1.1 To sustain a charg~ under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code,
the mere fact that the accused made a statement leading to the discovery of the
G _stolen articles under s. 27 of the Evidence Act, by itself is not sufficient.
There must be something more to connect the accused with the commisson of
the offence. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution in tl\e instant
case led to no other inference than that of guilt of the accused as murder and
robbery are proved to have been integral parts of one and the same transaction
and therefore the presumption arising under illustration (a) to s. 1J4 of the
H
Evidence Act is that not only the accused committed the murder of the deceas-
ed j_ but also committed robbery of her gold ornaments which formed part of
the same transaction. The prosecution had led sufficient evidence tO <;onneq:
the accused with the conrmi.,ion of the crime. [561 G-Hl
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EARABHADRAl'PA v. KARNATAJ{A
553
1.2 .For the applicability of s. 27 of the Evidence Act, two conditions are
pre-requisite, viz: (1) Infonnation must be such _as has caused discovery of
~,
the fact, and (2) The information must "relate distinctly" to tlie fact discovered."
Under s. 27, only so much of the information as distinctly relates to the facts
really thereby discovered is admissible. The word
1'fact" means some concrete
or material fact to which the information directly relates. (549A, 5SOB-C]
Pulukuri Kottayya v. Empetor, LR [1947] IA 65 ; Jajfer Hussein Dastgir
V. State of Maharashtra, [1970] 2 S.C.R. 332, referred to.
IJ
2.1 The nature of presumption under illustration (a) to s. 114 of the
Evidence Act from recent and unexplained possession must depend upon the
nature of the evidence adduced. As to the meaning of "recent posses&ion•!, it
was observed: No fixed time limit can be laid down to ·determine whether
possession is recent or otherwise and each case must be judged on _its own facts.
C·
The question as to what amounts to recent possession sufficient to justify the
presumption of guilt varies according as the stolen article is or is not caJculat·
<0d to pass readily from hand to hand. The fact that a period of one year had
elapsed between the commission of the crime and the recovery of the orna·
ments on a statement made by the accused leading to their discovery un'1er
s. 27 of the Evidence Act immediately upon his being apprehended by the
police, cannot be said to be too long particularly when the .accused had been V
absconding during that period and the stolen articies were such as were-not
likely to pass readily from hand to hand. There was no lapse of time between
the date of his arrest and the recovery of the stolen property. The accused had
no satisfactory explanation to offer for his possession thereof. On ~e
contrary, he denied that the stolen proExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.