DWARKADAS MARFATIA & SONS versus BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF BOMBAY

Citation: [1989] 2 S.C.R. 751 · Decided: 27-04-1989 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SABYASACHI MUKHERJI · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 5 judgment(s) · cites 7 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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DWARKADAS MARFATIA & SONS 
v. 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF BOMBAY 
APRIL 27, 1989, 
[SABY ASACHI MUKHARJI, M.H. KANIA AND 
S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.] 
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 12, 14, 32 and 22~ 
'Bqmbay Port Trust'-Whether 'State'-Evicting its tenant and granting 
the land in question to another tenant-Frontiers of judicial revie1t of 
such action. 
The respondent Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay is a 
statutory authority, and as such has been exempted from the operation 
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of the .. Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 
1947. The appellant has been the lessee of the respondent since about 
1932 in respect of part of the original plot No. 4 (now plot SB) which 
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adjoins plot No. 6 tenanted by M/s Bombay Bharat & Swadeshi Rice 
Mills. In or about 1933-34, M/s Bombay Bharat & Swadeshi Rice Mills 
took over the appellant, and a rice mill was started on appellant's part 
of plot No. 4 and plot No. 6. 
In December 19S7, the Town Planning Scheme No. ·1 in Bombay 
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City came into force, and the original plot No. 4 was reconstituted into 
final plot No. S. In or about 1963 the respondent sub-divided plot No. S 
into final plot SA and final plot SB, and as a result of the sub-division 
M/s Dhanji Mavji became the tenant/occupant of a major portion of 
plot SB, In 1970'71 the respondent agreed to let the entire plot SB, 
including the portion which had been let to and was in possession of the 
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appellant since 1933, to Dhanji Mavji. The appellant objected to the 
offer made to Dhanji Mavji but the respondent asserted that as Dhanji 
Mavji had been in possession of the major portion of plot No. SB, it 
agreed to let the entire plot to them. In the premise, the respondent 
purported to terminate the tenancy of the appellant in respect of its 
portion of plot SB, and later tiled snit for eviction. The Trial Court G 
dismissed the suit holding that it would be legitimate to infer that the 
letting was for a manufacturing purpose and hence the notice of ter-
mination was had. The appellate court reversed that decision. 
Aggrieved thereby, the appellant tiled a writ petition under Article 227 
of the Constitution. The High Court accepted the finding of the appel-
late court that the notice of ejectment was valid notice and there was no 
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waiver of notice. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 
Before this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that 
(1) the exemption from the operation of the Rent Act was given to the 
Port Trust Authority on the assumption that it would act in public 
interest and would not behave like ordinary landlords; (2) the action of 
the respondent in terminatin! the appellant's contractual tenancy had a 
public law character attached to it and was accordingly subject to 
judicial review; (3) every action of the respondent which was 'State' 
within Article 12 of the Constitution, whether it be in the field of con-
tract or any other field, was subject to Article 14 of the Constitution and 
must be reasonable and taken only upon lawful and relevant grounds of 
public interest; (4) the respondent's established rational/policy was to 
offer /allot a final/reconstituted plot for development to the existing 
occupants thereof as joint tenants; and (5) the eviction of the appellant 
was not necessary in the public interest for the proper development of 
the plot as required by the Town Planning Scheme. 
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that (1) the onus was 
entirely on the appellant to establish that the Bombay Port Trust had 
terminated the tenancy or taken the proceedings in eviction not in 
public interest but for a collateral purpose or mala fide or that it had 
acted ln a manner contrary to the provisions of Article 14; (2) since 
there was no obligation or duty cast upon the Bombay Port Trust to 
provide accommodation, there could be no question of acting in govern-
mental character, and such a body stood on the same footing as any 
other citizen and would, in respect of such activity, not be subjected to 
public law duty; (3) the respondent's dealing with tenants was a con-
tractual dealing and it was not a matter for public law domain and was 
not subject to judicial review; and (4) it was the policy of the respondent 
to allot the entire re-constituted plot to one person who was occupying 
the major portion of such plot, for its proper development. 
Disn1issing the appeal, it 

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