DR. SR. TESSY JOSE AND OTHERS versus STATE OF KERALA

Citation: [2018] 9 S.C.R. 479 · Decided: 01-08-2018 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.K. SIKRI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
479
DR. SR. TESSY JOSE AND OTHERS
v.
STATE OF KERALA
(Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 2018)
AUGUST 01, 2018
[A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 –
s.19(1) r/w. s.21(1) – Prosecution case was that victim was raped
when she was minor – As a result, she became pregnant and
thereafter delivered a child in hospital – A case was registered
against the appellants u/s. 201 r/w. s.34 and s.19(1) r/w. s.21(1) of
POCSO Act – Appellant nos. 1 & 2 were medical practitioners and
appellant no.3 was a Hospital administrative – Allegation was that
when victim was brought to the hospital her age was recorded as 18
years and appellants ought to have gathered that at the time of
conception she was less than 18 years, and informed relevant
authorities, which they failed to do – Held: u/s.19(1) of the Act
there is no obligation on the person to investigate and gather
knowledge – The medical records showed that appellant no.1
attended victim first time when the child was delivered and records
stated she was 18 years of age at that time – Appellant no.1 did not
know that the victim was minor when she had sexual intercourse –
Appellant no.2 had not even examined the victim and had just
advised that child be given to the mother – Appellant no.3, being
the administrator of the hospital it was not possible for her to be
aware of the details of each patient – The knowledge requirement
foisted on the appellants cannot be that they ought to have
deducted from circumstances that an offence has been committed –
No evidence to implicate the appellants – Thus, proceedings against
appellants quashed – Penal Code 1860 – s.201 r/w. s.34.
Words and Phrases – Knowledge – Meaning of.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. What is alleged against the appellants is that they
had the knowledge that an offence under the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 had been committed
  [2018] 9 S.C.R. 479
479
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
480
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2018] 9 S.C.R.
and, therefore, they were required to provide this information to
the relevant authorities which they failed to do. As per the material
collected by the prosecution and filed in the Court, no such case
is made out.  The statement of the mother of the victim was
recorded by the police.  The  statement of the victim was also
recorded.  They have not stated at all that when the victim was
brought  to the hospital, her mother informed the appellants that
she had been raped by the accused no. 1 when she was a minor.
Admittedly, the victim was pregnant and immediately went into
labour.  In these circumstances, it was the professional duty of
Appellant No. 1 to attend to her and conduct the delivery, which
she did.  Likewise, after the baby was born, the Appellant No.2
as a Paediatrician performed her professional duty. Appellant no.
3 had not come in contact with the victim or the baby at all.  Being
the administrator of the hospital it was not possible for her to be
aware of the details of each patient.  It would not be possible for
appellant no. 3 to be aware of the circumstances surrounding the
admission of the victim. [Paras 7, 8 and 12] [483-G-H; 484-A-B;
485-B-C]
3.  The entire case set up against the appellants is on the
basis that when the victim was brought to the hospital her age
was recorded as 18 years.  On that basis appellants could have
gathered that at the time of conception she was less than 18 years
and was, thus, a minor and, therefore, the appellants should have
taken due care in finding as to how the victim became pregnant.
Fastening the criminal liability on the basis of the aforesaid
allegation is too far-fetched.  The provisions of Section 19(1) of
the POCSO Act,  put a legal obligation on a person to inform the
relevant authorities, inter alia, when he/she has knowledge that
an offence under the Act had been committed.  The expression
used is “knowledge” which means that some information received
by such a person gives him/her knowledge about the commission
of the crime.  There is no obligation on this person to investigate
and gather knowledge.  If at all, the appellants were not careful
enough to find the cause of pregnancy as the victim was only 18
years of age at the time of delivery.  But that would not be
translated into criminality.  The knowledge requirement foisted
on the appellants cannot be that they ought to have deduced from
circumstances that an offence has been committed. Accordingly,
A
B
C
D

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.