LexDR. RASH LAL YADAV versus STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.
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DR. RASH LAL YADAV
v.
STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.
JUNE 23, 1994
(A.M. AHMADI AND"M.M. PUNCHHI, JJ.]
Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking over of Manage-
ment and Control) Act, 1981 : Sectio'!s 10(6) and 7.
A
B
Bihar School Service Board-Chairman-Appointment for a tenure of C
three years-Functioning of Chairman-Detrimental to the interest of
Board-RemovaHleld : State Government's power of removal is not un-
guided and absolute-Opportunity to show cause before removal held ex-
cluded-Removal can be done within the tenure perioJ-Doctrine of
pleasure-Applicability of
Consh"tution of India, 1950 : Article 14. Statute-{]nguided and ab-
solute powe.-Section 10(7) of the Bihar Non-Government Secondary School
(Taking over of Management and Control) Act, 1981-Held not violative of
Article 14.
Service Law-Tenure post-Removal before expiry of tenure-f'e1.nis-
sibility of
Administrative la~atural justice-Where the Statute expressly or by
implication excludes natural justice-Statute cannot be invalidated for this
D
E
omission on the ground of aroitrariness.
F
The appellant was appointed as chairman of the Bibar School Ser-
vice Board for a term of there years. Snbseqnent to bis appointment
Government received complaints against him regarding mismanagement,
conducting farce interviews, improper behaviour with other Board Mem·
hers, and inviting applications for appointment of teachers in defiance of G
the Government's direction. On the basis of the complaints received the
Government concluded that the manner in which the appellant was
functioning was not condncive to the proper working of the Board l\Or was
it in public interest. Accordingly, the Government by its order dated April
4, 1991, passed in exercise of its power under sob- section (7) of Section H
231
232
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A 10 of the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking over of
Management and Control) Act, 1981, removed him from service.
B
The appellant questioned the validity of the order before the High
Court which examined the material on which the State Government's
decision for removal was founded and came to the conclusion that (I) there
was justification for the exercise of the power and therefore, the State
Government was justified in ordering his removal; and (ii) the material
placed before it did not prove the allegation of malice or lack of bona fide.
The High Court rejected the contentions of the appellant that (1)
C Section 10(7) was ultra vires Article 14 because it conferred unguided and
absolute power of removal on the Government; (ii) the doctrine of pleasure
applies only to Government servants and cannot be extended to statutory
offices; (iii) since the appellant was appointed on a tennre post he was
entitled to continue on the post till the expiry of the period; (iv) the order
was passed in violation of natural justice because no opportunity to show
D cause was given to him; and (v) even in the absence of a specific provision
the requirement of natural justice must be read into the said provision.
In coming to its conclusion the High Court took note of changes
brought about in the Act which was preceded by the Ordinance viz., (i) in
E
sub-section 6 of section 10 of the Act while duration of the appointment of
Chairman for 3 years as provided in Ordinance was retained, the words
'or during the pleasure of the State Government' were added i.e. for the
. first time Pleasure Doctrine was incorporated in the Act; (ii) in snb·section
(7) of section 10 of the Act two changes were introduced: (a) the Chairman
could be removed by giving one month's notice or one month's salary in
F
lieu of notice and (b) the proviso incorporating the rule of natural justice,
namely of giving reasonable opportunity of showing cause, was deleted.
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant
that the requirement of giving an opportunity to show cause, though not
G specifically provided for, must be read into the Act otherwise the Act may
be rendered ultra vires as conferring absolute and unfettered power on the
State Government.
On behalf of the State it was contended that (i) the requirement of
giving the delinquent Chairman an opportunity to show cause before
H exercise of power of removal should not be read into Section 10(7) because
R.L.YADAV(DR.) v.STATEOFBIHAR
233
the Legislature has consciously done away with the requirement for the A
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