LexDR. N. B. KHARE versus THE STATE OF DELHI
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S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 519 Even assuming for argument's sake that we have got jurisdiction under article 136, the exercise of which would ,depend upon the circumstances of each case, in view of the reasons which we have set out above, this is not · an appeal which, in our opinion, should be a9mitted even if we have the power to do so. -The result is that tlie preliminary objection succeeds and the appeal fails and dismissed with costs. 1950 Bharat Bank Ltd v. Employeu •f Bharat Bllllk PATANJALI SASTRI J.-1 entirely agree with the PAiar!iali Sa11ri, judgment just now delivered by Mukherjea J. and I have oothing to add. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai for Tanubhai C. Desai. Agent for the respondents : R. R. Biswas. Agent for the Union of India: P. A. Mehta. DR. N. B. KHARE fl. THE STATE OF DELHI , SHRI HARILAL KANIA C. J., SAIYID FAZL Au, PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, ' and MuKHERJEA, JJ.] Constitution of India, Art 19, els. (1) (d) and (5)-Funda- mental rights-Freedom of movement-Law imposing restrictions- V alidity -Reasonableness of restrictions-Scope of enquiry-East P11n1ab Public Safety Act, 1949, s. 4(1) (c), (3), (6)-Provisions empowering Provincial Government or District Magistrate to extern persons· mqking satisfaction of externing authority final, authorising e:rternment for indefinite period, and directing that authority "may communicate" grounds of e:rternment-Whether reasonable-Con- struction and Validity of Act. 1950 May 26. 1950 Dr. N. B. Khart v. T ht St alt of Delhi 520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950) Section 4, sub-s. (I) (c), of the East Punjab Public Safety Act of 1949 which was passed on the 29th March, 1949, and was to be in force until the 14th August, 1951, provided that ''The Provincial Government or the District Mag.lstratC. if satisfied \Vith respect to any particular person that with a view to pre- venting hirn from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order it is necessary to do so, 1nay, by order in writing, give a direction that such person shall rcn1ove himself fron1, and shall not return to, any area that 1nay oe specified in the order." Sub-section (3) of s. 4 provided that "an order under sub-s. (I) made by the District Magistrate shall not, unless the Provincial Government by special order othe,wise directs, remain in force for more than three months fron1 the n1aking thereof," and sub-s. ( 6) laid down that "when an order has been macle in respect of any person under any of the clauses under s. 4, sub-s. (!) or sub-s. (2), the grounds of it may be com- municated to him by the authority making the order, and in any case when the order is to be in force tor more than three months, he shall have a right of maki1'.g a representation which shall be referred to the Advisory Tribunal constituted under s. 3, sub·s. ( 4) ." ·The petitioner, against whom an order under s. 4 (I) ( c) of the Act was passed applied to the Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of cn·tiorari contending that the order was illegal inasmuch as the provisions of t_he above· mentioned Act under wliich the order was made infringed the fundamental right to move freely throughout the territory of India which was guaranteed by Art. 19 (I) (d) of the Constitution and were accordingly void under Art. 13 (I) of the Constitution : Held, per KANIA C. J., FAzL ALI and PATANJALI SAsTRI, JJ- (MAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA, JJ. dissenting)-(i) that there was nothing unreasonable in the provision contained in sub-s. (I) (c) of s. 4 empowering the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate to make an extcrnment order, and making their satisfaction as to the necessity of making such an order final, or in the provisions contained in sub-s. ( 3) of s. 4 that an order of a District Magistrate may remain in force for three months and that the Provincial Government may make an order, or keep alive an order made by a District Magistrate, for a period exceeding three months without fixing any time limit; (ii) with regard to stJb-s. ( 6), the word "may" in the expression "may communicate" must, in the context, be read as meaning "shall" and under the sub~scction it is obligatory on the authority making an order to communicate the grounds to the externec; (iii) the restrictions imposed by the above-me
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