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DR. INDRAMANI PYARELAL GUPTA versus W.R. NATHU AND OTHERS.

Citation: [1963] 1 S.C.R. 721 · Decided: 11-04-1962 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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1 S.C.R . 
SUPR.EME UOL
1RT REPORTS 
721 
l>R. INDRAMANI PYARELAL GTJP1
1A 
v. 
W.R. NATHU AND OTHERS. 
- (B. P. SINHA, c. J., K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJ.A.GOP.A.LA 
AYYANG.A.R, J. R. MunHOLKAR and T. L. 
VENXA.T.A.RA.M.A. A!Y.A.R, JJ.} 
Forward Oontracts-Regulation of-Bye-laws empowering 
cloaing out of hedge contracta--Validity of-If can operate 
retrospectively-East India Ootton As1ociation Bye-laws cl. 
62.A-Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1962 (LXXIV of 
1962), ss. 4, 11 and 12. 
The appellants were members of the East India Cotton 
Association which was an association recognised by the Cen• 
tral Government under the Forward Markets Regulation Act, 
1952. Prim to December 1955, they had entered into "hedge 
contracts" in respect of cotton for settlements in February 
and May 1956 in accordance with the bye-laws of the Associa· 
tion. Towards tb.e end of 1955 it was apprehended that the 
forward market in cotton was heading for a crisis aud the 
Central Government issued notifications directing the Asso-
ciation to suspend business in hedge contracts for February 
and May 1956 deliveries for short periods this did not improve 
the situation. On January 21, 1956, the Central Govern· 
ment, acting under s. 12 of the Act, made a new bye-law in 
substitution of bye-Jaw 52AA of the Association which em-
powered the Forward Markets Commission, constituted under, 
the Act, to issue a notification tlosing out all hedge contracts 
at rates fixed by the Commission. On January 24, 1956, the 
Commission issued a notification closing out all hedge contracts 
including those subsisting on that date, and fixed the rates for 
the settlement of such contracts. The appellants contended 
that the amended bye.law 52AA was invalid as the power to 
close out hedge contracts could not be conferred upon the 
Commission and as the Association was in law incapable of 
conferring such a power on the Commission or on any other 
body and that in any cases the bye-law could not operate 
retrospectively so as to affect existing contracts. 
Held, (per Sinha, C. J., Ayyangar, Mudholkar and 
Aiyar, JJ. Subba Rao, J. contra), that the amended bye-law 
52AA was not ultra virc1 the Central Government and validly 
empowered the Commission to close an hedge contracts in 
cotton including existing contracts. Clause (f) of 1, .f. of the 
Act provided that one of the functions of the Commission 
~9G2 
Dr. lnbom1r.i 
p_,..,1.1 Gupta 
v. 
W.R. N itllu 
722 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] 
shall be to perform such other duties and exercise such other 
powers as may be assigned to the Commission "by or under 
the Act, as may be prescribed". There was no limitation 
upon the nature of the power that may be conferred under 
cl. (f) except that . it must be in relation to the regulation of 
forward trading in goods. It was not possible to place any 
limitation on this power by invoking the rule of •jU11dt.m v•neri• 
as there was no common positive thread running through 
els. (a) to (e) of s. 4. To judge whether legally a rower could 
be rested in a statutory body the proper rule o interpreta-
tion was that unless the nature of the power was such as to 
be inconsistant with the purpose for which the body was 
created or unless the particular power was contra-indicated 
by any specific provisions of the Act, any power which fur· 
thered the provisions of the Act could be legally conferred. 
Judge by this test the power conferred by the bye-law could 
be validly vested in the Commission. The power was one 
conferred ''under the Act
0
• 
The words "under the Act
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signified a power conferred by laws made by a subordinate 
Jaw-making authority which was empowered to do so by the 
Act. The impugned bye-law was clearly well within the 
bye-Jaw making power under ••· 11 and 12. The bye-law 
did not contravene article.• 64 of the Articles of Association of 
the Association as articles 64 applied only to the Board and 
placed no restrictions on the power of the Association. 
We•tern India Thtatro• Ltd. v. Municipal Oorporaticn o/ 
Poona, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 71, Huhli Electricity Oo. Ltd. v. 
Province of Bombay, 76 I.A. 57 and NarayanasUJamy Naidu v. 
Krish11aMu,thi, I.L.R. 1958 Mad. 513, referred to. 
' 
Further, upon a proper construction of the amended 
bye-law it applied not only to contracts to be entered into 
in future but also to subsisting contracts. A statute which 
could validly enact a law with retrospective effect could in 
express ter

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