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DR. GHANSHYAM JAISWAL versus KAMAL SINGH

Citation: [1996] 2 S.C.R. 759 · Decided: 16-02-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

DR. GHANSHYAM JAISWAL 
A 
v. 
KAMAL SINGH 
FEBRUARY 16, 1996 
[ K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.) 
B 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: 
Sections 11, 47-Suit for ejection-Compromise entered into- Decree 
for eviction after recording compromise and evidenc~Possession not C 
delivered-Execution petition for possession-Objected to on the ground that 
the decree was vague and incapable of being executed-Held, pa1ty precluded 
by constmctive res judicata to raise plea regarding executability of the 
decre~Libe1ty given to have the decree executed with the assistance of the 
Police. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3795 of 
1996. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.6.95 of the Madhya Pradesh 
High Court in C.R. No. 1252 of 1994. 
AK. Chitale and Niraj Sharma for the Appellant. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
Leave granted. 
D 
E 
F 
Though the respondent has been served by dasti, he is not appearing 
either in person or through counsel. The facts are eloquent. In a suit for 
ejectment filed on April 5, 1984, the respondent had entered into a 
compromise on foot of which the decree for eviction was granted after 
recording the compromise and evidence. The respondent did not deliver 
the possession of the demised property in terms of the compromise decree. G 
Therefore, the appellant was constrained to lay execution for possession of 
the property. In the first round of litigation, the respondent had challenged 
under section 47 of the C.P.C. impugning the validity of the compromise 
decree which was turned down by the executing Court. The High Court 
dismissed W.P. No. 2849of1994 by order dated August 19, 1994. Against H 
759 
760 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 
A 
the respondent laid another objection under Section 47 contending that the 
decree is vague and incapable of being executed. That was turned down by 
the executing Court on September 30, 1994. Against that, the respondent 
filed a revision in the High Court. The High Court in the impugned order 
allowed the revision by order dated June 21, 1995 in C.R. No. 1252/94 since 
B the counsel for the appellant had reported no instructions. 
The only question is : whether the respondent is entitled to raise the 
plea of vagueness? Having entered into the compromise and suffered a 
decree on foot of compromise and also having raised the plea of non-ex-
ecutability of the compromise decree and having become unsuccessful, he 
C is precluded by constructive res judicata, of might and ought in Explana-
tion VI to Section 11, to raise any other plea of the executability of the 
decree. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in allowing the 
revision and setting aside the Execution application. 
The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court is 
D set aside. The appellant is at liberty to have the decree executed with the 
assistance of the police. No costs. 
G.N. 
Appeal allowed.