DR. BOOL CHAND versus THE CHANCELLOR, KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSHY

Citation: [1968] 1 S.C.R. 434 · Decided: 04-09-1967 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.C. SHAH · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

DR. BOOL CHAND 
v. 
THE CHANCELLOR, KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSHY 
September 4, I 967 
A 
[J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI AND J. M. SHELAT, JJ.) 
B 
Kurukshetra University Act, 1956, Sch, I CC.4(vi) & (vii)-Ptm· 
jab General Clauses Act, 1898-s. 14. Chancellor given power to ap-
point Vice-Chancellor but not to determine 
employment-whether 
such power implied in power to appoint-Nature of Vice-Chancellor's 
employment-whether contractual-whether rules of natural justice 
required to be followed when determining his employment. 
The appellant was a member of the Indian Administrative Ser- c 
vice in the Madhya Pradesh Cadre and was compulsorily retired from 
the Service fo.1: n;.1sl'·J11duct !Jy an -urder of the President in February, 
1963. In June, 1965 he was appointed Vice-Chancellor of the Kuru-
kshetra University, by the then Chancellor of the University. On 
March 31; 1966 the new Chancellor who was in office at the time, 
ordered· the suspension of \he appellant from the office of Vice-Chan-
cellor and also issued to hiln a notice to show cause why his services D 
should not be terminated. The appellant filed a petition in the High 
Court seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus to quash the Chancel-
lor's order of suspension. In the meantime the Chancellor passed an 
order on May 8, 1966, in exercise of the power under Clause 4(vi) 
of Schedule I to the Kurukshetra University Act, 1956, read with s.14 
of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1398, terminating the services of 
the appellant with immediate effect. The appellant then amended his 
petition and sought a writ of certiorari to quash the order of May 8. E 
1966. The High Court rejected the petition. 
In appeal to this Court. it was contended on behalf of the appel-
lant, inter alia, (i) that the Chancellor had no power under the Act 
or the Statutes to terminate the tenure of office of a Vice Chancellor; 
and (ii) that the Chancellor was bound to hold an enquiry in accor-
dance with the rules of natural justice before determining the ap-
pellant's tenure. but the appellant had not been given a proper oppor- F 
!unity to · explain why his services should no~, be terminated and, 
furthermore, the Chancellor had taken into consideration evidence 
which was not disclosed to the appellant. 
On the other hand, it was contended for the 
respondent that 
since the claim for relief by the respondent was founded on an dleg-
cd breach of contract, the remedy of the appellant. if any, lay in an 
action for dama.ges and not in a petition for a high prerogative writ G 
HELD, dismissing the appeal: 
(i) The absence of a provision setting up the procedure for deter-
mining the employment of the Vice-Chancellor in the Act or the 
Statutes or Ordinances does not lead to the inference that the tenure 
of office of Vice-Chancellor is not liable to be determined. [439H] 
A po\\'er to appoint ordinarily implies a power to determine em- H 
ployment and this rule is incorporated in s.14 of the Punjab General 
Clauses Act I of 1898. [437H-438A] 
S. R. Titvari v. District Board, Agra, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 55 and 
Leklirai Sathramda.s Lalvani v. N. M. Shah, Deputy Custodian-cum-
Managing Officer. Born.bay, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 120; referred to. 
BOOL OllAND ~: Cl!ANOELLOB 
435 
A 
An intention contrary to the rule was not evidenced either by the 
fact that under Clause 4(vii) of the Statutes the appointment of a 
Vice-Chancellor is for three years or because there was no express 
provision covering the determination of service of a Vice-Chancellor 
for misconduct as there was in the c- of teachers. ClauSe 4(vii) of 
the Statutes does not purport to confer upon a person appointed Vice-
Chancellor rn indefeasible right to continue in office for three years; 
B the clause merely places a restriction upon the power of the Chancel-
lor, when fixing the tenure of the office of Vice-Chancellor. It could 
not be held that a person appointed a Vice-Chancellor is entitled to 
continue in office for the full period of his appointment even if it 
turns out that he is physically decrepit, mentally infirm, or grossly 
immoral. [ 438E-F; 439G-H) 
S.14 of the General Clauses Act is a general provision: it does 
C not merely deal with the appointment of public servants. It deals 
with all appointments, and there is no reason to hold, having regard 
to the context in which the expression occurs, that the authority in-
vested with the power of appointment has the power to determine 
employment as a penalty, but not otherwis

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