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DR. BAIS SURGICAL AND MEDICAL INSTITUTE PVT. LTD & ORS. versus DHANANJAY PANDE

Citation: [2026] 5 S.C.R. 347 · Decided: 04-05-2026 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2026] 5 S.C.R. 347 : 2026 INSC 447
Dr. Bais Surgical and Medical Institute Pvt. Ltd & Ors. 
v. 
Dhananjay Pande
(Civil Appeal No. 8973 of 2010)
04 May 2026
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether, in the absence of a formal entry of the respondent 
no.1’s name in the register of members, he could nonetheless be 
regarded as a “member” of the appellant-company so as to invoke 
the jurisdiction of the Company Law Board u/ss.397 and 398 of 
the Companies Act, 1956.
Headnotes†
Companies Act, 1956 – ss.2(27), 41, 397, 398, 399 – “member” – 
High Court and the Company Law Board upheld respondent 
no.1 as a deemed member of the company, entitled to maintain 
a petition u/ss.397 and 398 – Whether the respondent no.1 
could be regarded as a “member” of the appellant-company so 
as to maintain a petition u/ss.397 and 398, despite the absence 
of formal entry of his name in the register of members at the 
relevant point of time:
Held: Yes – The requirement that an agreement to become a 
member be “in writing”, introduced by the Amendment Act of 1960, 
was intended to ensure reliable proof of consent and to prevent 
fraudulent inclusion of names in the register, and not to impose 
entry in the register as the sole or exclusive mode of acquiring 
membership – The equitable foundation of ss.397 and 398 must 
be a guiding factor to not construe the expression “member” in 
an unduly restrictive or technical manner confined solely to formal 
entry in the register, frustrating the remedial purpose underlying 
the legislative scheme – A conjoint reading of ss.397, 398 and 
399 indicates that the expression “member” cannot be construed 
in isolation or confined to the technical formulation contained 
in s.41(2) – Rather, the broader definition embodied in s.2(27) 
assumes significance in determining whether a person is entitled 
to invoke the remedies contemplated under the Act – It would 
348
[2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
be contrary to settled principles of interpretation to attribute to 
the Legislature an intention to create conflicting meanings of the 
same expression within the statute – The expression “member”, 
when employed in the context of remedies u/ss.397 and 398, must 
therefore be construed with reference to the wider definitional 
framework provided in s.2(27) and allied provisions governing the 
rights of members – The conclusion treating respondent no.1 as a 
member was founded upon a consistent and cumulative chain of 
factual circumstances demonstrating recognition of his proprietary 
interest in the appellant company – On facts, respondent no.1 
was consistently treated as a stakeholder having interest in the 
appellant company rather than as a mere investor or creditor – 
High Court also relied upon the financial and operational conduct 
of the company, which showed that respondent no.1’s investment 
was accepted and utilised for the expansion of the company’s 
business, resulting in increased authorised share capital and 
profitability – Respondent no. 1 had, in substance, acquired the 
status of a shareholder whose interest stood recognised by the 
company over a considerable period – High Court was justified 
in affirming the finding that respondent no.1 was entitled to be 
treated as a member for the purposes of maintaining proceedings 
u/ss.397 and 398. [Paras 21, 23, 29-31]
Companies Act, 1956 – ss.2(27), 41, 397, 398, 399 – “member” – 
Inclusive definition of “member” u/s.2(27) vis-à-vis s.41 dealing 
with acquisition of membership – Whether the expression 
“member” as appearing u/ss.397 and 398 is to be construed 
strictly in accordance with s.41 or it must be understood in 
the broader sense contemplated u/s.2(27) – Meaning and 
scope of the expression “member”, as occurring in ss.397, 
398 and 399:
Held: The statutory framework under the Act, 1956 draws a clear 
distinction between the inclusive definition of the term “member” 
contained in s.2(27) and the provisions governing acquisition of 
membership set out in s.41 – s.2(27) employs language of wide 
amplitude and, in relation to a company, embraces every category 
of member, subject only to the limited exclusion of a bearer of a 
share-warrant issued u/s.114 of the Act – Whereas, s.41 operates 
in a different sphere and prescribes the recognised modes by which 
membership may arise – It contemplates, first, deemed membership 
in the case of subscribers to the memorandum; secondly, persons 
[2026] 5

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