LexDR. AKSHAIBAR LAL AND OTHERS versus THE VICE-CHANCELLOR, BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY, AND OTHERS.
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january ro, . \ 386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] DR. AKSHAIBAR LAL AND OTHERS v. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR, BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY, AND·OTHERS. (and connected appeals) (S. K. D.As, M. HrDAYATULLAH and J. C. SHAH, JJ.) Ranaras University-Disciplinary action against employees- Enactment providing for special procedure-Ent~ctment. whether supersedes earlier procedure or a~reements-Banaras H1'ndu, Univer- sity Act, 1915 (r6 of I9I5). s. r8-0rdinance No. 6-Banaras Hindu University (Amendment) Act, 1958 (34 of 1958), Stalttte No. 30, as amended. On June !4. 1958, the President of India promulgated an Ordinance to amend the Banaras Hindu University Act, rgrs. By s. 8 of the Ordinance, the Statutes of the University were amended, and in place of Statute No. 30, another st;1tute was substituted, which set up a "Screening Committee" to examine the cases of all persons holding teaching, administrative or other posts in the University at the commencement of the Ordinance, in respect of whom there was reason to believe that their continu· ance iu office woulrl be detrimental to the interests of the University, and to forward its recommendations to the Executive Council to take such action as it may deem fit. The Ordinance was repealed by the Banaras Hindu University (Amendment) Act, rg58, which re-enacted Statute No. 30. Under the re-enacted Statute before any action could be taken by the Executive Council as referred to above, the matter had first to be referred to the Solicitor-General of the Government of India, who, if he was of the opinion that there was pri rna facie case for inquiry, shall refer the case of the person concerned to a committee, known as the Reviewing Committee. On receipt of the recommendations of the Reviewing Committee, the Executive Council was to take such action thereon as it thought fit, after giving the person concerned a reasonable opportunity for being heard. Apart from Statute No. 30, added by Parliament, the Executive Council could termi- nate the engagement of an employee by taking action under the terms of the agreement, where such agreement existed, or under Ordinance No. 6, framed under the Act, without assigning a cause, on four months' notice or four months' salary in lieu of notice. The cases of the appellants who held posts under the Univer~ sity were considered in accordance with the procedure laid down in Statute No. 30 by the Solicitor-General who then sent up their cases to the Reviewing Committee. The appellants appeared before the Committee and made their representations. The Com- mittee sent its findings in respect of the appellants except one to the Executive Council who then called upon four of them to show cause why their services should not be terminated, in view of the 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 387 findings of the Committee that the continuance in office of those I96I appellants was detrimental to the interests of the University. No· ·- notices, however, were sent to appellants 2, 4, 5 and 6. Appel- Dr. Akshaibar Lal lants I, 3. 7 and 8 having filed petitions in the High Court ot v. Allahabad under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for relief Vice-Chance_llor, against the proposed action and proceedings having been stayed, Banaras Hindu the Executive Council passed a resolution, No. 8g, on May 15, University rg6o, that the consideration of their cases was postponed till after the writ petitions were disposed of by the High Court. On the same day, however, the Executive Council passed r esolutions, Nos. go, 94 to g6 and 99 to roz. terminating the services of all the appellants giving them four or six months' salary in lieu of notice. The appellants challenged the validity of the resolutions on the grounds, inter alia, (1) that the Executive Council could not take recourse to the provi.c:.ions of Ordinance No. 6 having started action under Statute No. 30, (2) that Ordinance No. 6 was subordinate to Statute No. 30 and could not p revail where Statute So. 30 applied, (3) that action against respondents I , 3, 7 and f\ \\':\s stayed by the High Court and resolution No. 89 and that any action thereafter under the agreement or Ordinance No. 6 was incompetent, and (4) that, in any case, the action of the Executive Council was mala fide and a fraud upon the Univer- sity Act and Statute No. 30. The case for the University author- ities was that the Executive Council could take action under the terms oi th
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