LexDIVISIONAL PERSONNEL OFFICER, SOUTHERN RAILWAY & ANR. versus T. R. CHALLAPPAN
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783
DIVISIONAL PERSONNEL OFFICER, SOUTHERN RAILWAY
& ANR.
v.
T. R. CHALLAPPAN
September IS, 1975
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[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, A. C. GUPTA ANDS. M. FAZAL ALI, JJ.]
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Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, s.12 and Railway Servants (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules~ 1968, r.14 (1) -
Release on probation under the Act-
Effect on power to take disciplinary· .acdon .
Rule 14(1) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968,
provides that not withstanding anything contained in rr.9 to 13, where any
penalty is imposed on a railway· servant on the ground of conduct which has
led to his convictioll on a criminal charge, the disciplinary authority may consider
the circumstances of the casei and make such orders thereon as it deems fit,
Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, provides that notwith~
standing anything contained in any other law. a person found guilty of an offence
and dealt with under the provisions of s.3 or s.4 shall not suffer a disq_uaiifica.
tion, if any, attached to a conviction of an offence under such law.
The respondents were found guilty of certain minor offences a.nd instead of
being sentenced, were released on probation under the provis_ions of the Proba,-.
tion of Offenders Act.
The concerned Disciplinary Authorities however, re-
moved them from service on the ground of their conviction without any fur-
ther opportunity to the respondents. ·Tue respondents challenged the orders of
removal and the High Court quashed the orders.
Dismissing the appeals to this Court,
HELD : ( 1) The conviction of the delinquent employee would be taken
as sufficient proof of misconduct, and then, the authority will have to hold
a 'summary inquiry as to the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed. If
the authority is of the opinion that the offence is tOOI trivial or d a technical
nature it may not impose any penalty in spite of the conviction, If thel autho-
rity is of the opinion that the employee has been guilty of. a serious offence
involving moral turpitude, and therefore it was not desirable or conducive in
the interests of administration to retain such a perason in service, the di&.cipli-
nary authority has the undoubted power, after head'ing the employee and
considering the circumstances of the case, to inflict any penalty without
ariy further departmental inquiry,
As there was no such application of mind·
and consideration of circumstances the orders of removal are rightly quashed.
[795H-796E, HJ
(2) The view of the Kerala High Court, that a• the Magistrate released the
delinquent employee on probation, no penalty was imposed and that therefore
r.14 (I)' did not apply, is not correct.
The word 'pen;Uty' in the rule is rela·
table to the penalties to be imposed by the DisclplinaIY Authorities
under
the Rutes and not to the sentence passed by a criminal court. Because, so far
as the disciplinary authority is concerned it
conJd only
impose a penalty
and not a sentence, just as a criminal court, after conviction, does not impose- a
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penalty but passes a sentence: Hence, the w9rds '''Yhc:re anJ'.' pep.alty is impo~ec!''
in r.14 {1) should be read as 'where any pen~Ity ts 1mposs1ble by the D1sc1ph-
nary Authority.
[787E.F; 788A-ll; .789D·HJ
2-Lll27SCI/75
7'84
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] I s.c.R.
(3) If the Magistrate did not choose, after convicting the accusCd, to pass
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any sentence on him but released him on probation it could not be said that
the stigma of conviction is completely washed out or obliterated or that no dis~
ciplinary action could be taken under r. 14(1). [790B-C]
Sections ·3, 4 arid 9 of the Probation of Offienders Act show that an order
of relea~ on probation comes into existence only after the accused is found
guilty and is convicted of the offence.
Such an order is merely in substitution
of the sentence from a humanist point of view.
The control over the offeader
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is retained by the criminal court and, where it is satisfied that the oond.itions
of the bond had been broken by the offender, who oo·s been released Qll pro-
bation the; Court can sentence on the basis of the original conviction showing
that the guilt is nor obliterated.
[790H-791D]
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( 4) The words disqualification, if any attaching to a conv1ct1on
of
an
offence under such law, in s. 12 mean (i) that there must be a disqualifica-
tion resulting from a conviction; and (i.i) that such disqualification must be
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