DIRECTOR OF RATIONING AND DISTRIBUTION versus THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA AND OTHERS

Citation: [1961] 1 S.C.R. 158 · Decided: 16-08-1960 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
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Judgment (excerpt)

Augu~r 16. 
158 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
DIRECTOR OF RATIONING AND 
DISTRIBUTION 
v. 
THE COHPORATION OF CALCUTTA 
.\ND OTHERS 
(1961] 
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM,·A. K. SARKAR, 
K. N. WANCHOO and J. C. SHAH, JJ.) 
Statute, interpretation of-State, if bound by stat11te--Pri1ici-
plcs applicable--" l'ason", if incl11dcs State-Calcutta Municipal 
Act, 1923 (Brn. II l of 1923), s. 386(1)(a)-Constit11tion of India, 
Art. 372. 
The appellant was using certain premises in Calcutta fo 
storing rice flour, etc. \vithout taking ~ut any license undc. 
s. 386(1)(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. 
The respon· 
dent f1Jccl a complaint against the appellant for a contravention 
of s. 306(1)(a). The trial 
~lagistratc acquitted the appellant 
holding that the provisions of s. 386(1)(a), neither in terms nor by 
necessary implication bound the Government whom the appel-
lant represented. 
In revision, the High Court held that the 
Government was bound by a statute unless the legislature 
excluded it expressly or by necessary implication. The High 
Court d•clined to follow the decision o! the Privy Council in 
L. R 73 I. A. 271 that the general principle applicable in Eng-
land applied to Indian legislation also. 
H cld, that the State was not bound by the pro,·isions of 
s. 386(1)(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, and that the 
appellant was not liable to be prosecuted for a contravention of 
this section. 
!'er Sinha, C. J., Imam and Shah, JJ.-The law applicable to 
India before the Constitution was as authoritatively laid down 
by the Privy Council in L. R. 73 I. A. 271. The Constitution has 
not made any change in the legal position. On the other hand 
it has clearly indicated that the laws in force before January 26, 
1950, shall continue to have validity even in the new set-up 
except in so far as they were in conflict with the express provi-
sions of the Constitution. The rule of interpretation of statutes 
that the State is not bound by a statute unless it is so provided 
in express terms or by necessary implication, is still good law. 
Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of 
Bombay, (1946) L.R. 73 I. A. 271, applied. 
Bell v. The Municipal Commissioners for the City of Madras, 
(1901) l.L.R 25 Mad. 457, disapproved. 
The Corporation of Caler.Ila v. Sub-Postmaster, Dharmatala 
Post Office, (1948) 54 C. W. N. 429, United States of A""'rica v. 
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COUitT REPORTS 
159 
United Mine Workers of America, (1947) gr L. Ed. 884, United 
States of America v. Reginald P. Wittek, (1949) 93 L. Ed. 1406, 
Less Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corporation, (1949) 
93 L. Ed. 1628 and Roberts v. Abern, (1904) l C. L. R. 406, referr-
ed to. 
There is nothing in the Act to inclica te that the State was 
bound by it by necessary implication, nor is there anything in it 
to show that ifs. 386 were not held to apply to the State the law 
would lose it efficacy or that its working would be hampered in 
any way. 
Per Sarkar, J.-The rule that the crown is not bound by 
the provisions of any statute unless it is directly or by necessary 
implication referred to is really a rule of construction of statutes 
and is not dependent on royal prerogatives. It has been applied 
by courts in India all along before the Constitution and there is 
no reason why it should not be applied to the interpretation of 
statutes after the Constitution. 
Attorney General v. Donaldson, (1842) ro M. & W. II7, Coomber 
v. Justices of Berks, (1883) g App. Cas. 61, Roberts v. Ahern, (1904) 
1 C.L.R. 406, United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 
(1947) 91 L. Ed. 884, United Statesv. The State of California, (1936) 
So L. Ed. 567, Bell v. The Municipal Commissioners for the City of 
Madras, (1901) I. L. R. 25 Mad. 457, Mersey Docks v. Cameron, 
(1865) II H. L. C. 443 and Coomber v. Justice of Berks, (1884) 9 
App. Cas. 61, Greig v. University of Edinburgh, (1868) L. R. l 
H. L. (Sc.) 348 and Cooper v. Hawkins, [1904] 2 K. B. 164, referr-
ed to. 
Section 386(1)(a) does not bind the Government by neces-
sary implication ; the fact that certain provision• of the Act 
expressly exempt the Government does not raise the necessary 
implication. Nor would the purposes 9f the Act be defeated if 
the Government were not bound by it. 
Hornsey Urban Council v. Hennel, [1902] 2 K. B. 7.l and 
Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation, Bombay, (1946) L.R. 
73 I. A. 271, relied on. 
Per Wanchoo, ].-The rule of construction which
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