DILHARSHANKAR C. BHACHECHA versus THE CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, AHMEDABAD

Citation: [1986] 1 S.C.R. 94 · Decided: 08-01-1986 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V.D. TULZAPURKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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DILHARS!IANKAR C. llHACllECHA 
v. 
THE CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, AHMEDABAD 
JANUARY 8, 1986 
[V.D. TULZAPURKAR AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.] 
Estate Duty Act, 1953 sections 2(15), 2(16), 2(19), 6 
and 29 - Interpretation of the words "paid" and "since" in 
section 29 - Joint will and mutual will - Conditions necessary 
to render mutual will irrevocable - The theory of contempora-
neous exposition and construction of the will in question. 
The appellant Dilharshankar c. Bhachech being one of the 
grand-sons of the deceased Kamlashankar Gopalshankar and a 
legatee under a joint will of his grand 
parents 
is the 
accountable person under the Estate Duty Act, 
1953. The 
deceased 
and his wife Mahendraba each possessed certain 
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properties which were of their own individual ownership. They 
were also jointly possessed of certain properties including a 
bungalow known as "Dilhar Dwar" - situated in the Ellisbridge 
area of Ahmedabad. On 24th December, 1950 the deceased and his 
wife had made a joint will in respect of the said bungalow. 
Mahendraba, one of the executants of the joint will died on 
3rd January, 1954. On the death of Mahendraba, estate duty on 
her share of the property which passed on her death to her 
husband Kamlashankar has been duly paid. Kamlashankar the 
other executant to the joint will died, thereafter on 25th 
October, 1964. Upon his· death, the appellant-cum-accountable 
person-cum-sole executor and trustee paid estate duty to the 
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remaining extent of 50% on the properties as mentioned in the 
joint will of the deceased Mahendraba and Kamlashankar. The 
appellant accountable persons in the returns filed contended; 
(i) since the property in question was settled by the joint 
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will in favour of the grandsons and since duty .had been paid 
on the death of one of the joint executants to the will, duty 
on the second death of the deceased was not payable on the 
whole estate by virtue of the provisions of section 29 of the 
Estate Duty Act; (ii) that on a true construction of the will, 
the deceased was neither at the time of his death nor any time -I 
during the continuance of the 
settlement, the full owner of 
the share of the property of Mahendraba because he had only a 
D.C. BHACHECH v. THE CONTROLLER 
95 
""\ life interest therein to receive rents and profits from that 
share, and therefore, exemption contempfated by section 29 of 
the Act came into force and hence no estate duty with regard 
to the share of Mahendraba on the death of the deceased 
Kamlashankar arose for the second time. The Revenue was of the 
opinion that on the death of Mahendraba, the wife, her husband 
had become the sole owner of the property in question, as is 
evident from the wealth tax returns filed by him and there-
fore, exemptions under section 29 of the Act cannot be 
""' claimed. 
Both the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty Ahmedabad 
as well as the Appellate Controller held against the account-
able person, taking the view that section 29 of the Estate 
Duty Act was not applicable. Full amunt of the Estate Duty 
was collected from the accountable person •. In an appeal before 
the Tribunal, the Tribunal on the construction of the will 
held in favour of the accountable person, for the reason that 
Kamlashankar did not become the full owner of the share of the 
property of Mahendraba on her death. 
At the instance of the Revenue the Tribunal referred the 
matter to the High Court of Gujarat. While refusing to inter-
pret the word "since" narrowly as contended by the Revenue, 
the High Court, however, answered on the construction of the 
will in its favour holding that "there was no agreement of 
irrevocability and the survivor took an absolute interest in 
the whole of the property and as such section 29 would have no 
application to the facts of the case. Hence the appeal by 
certificate. 
Allowing the appeal by certificate; 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
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HELD: l The interpretation sought for by the Revenue was 
highly artificial and against the spirit of section 29. Look-
ing at the language and the spirit of section 29 of the Estate 
Duty Act, 1953, it was clear that the expression "If the 
estate duty has already been paid -- since the date of the 
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settlement", occurring in the first part thereof, meant "if 
the estate duty has become payable or has been paid .either 
simultaneously wi.th the creation of the settlement 
or at 
any time thereafter." The d

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