DILBAGH RAI JARRY versus UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Citation: [1974] 2 S.C.R. 178 · Decided: 05-11-1973 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: HANS RAJ KHANNA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

178 
DILBAGH RAJ JARRY 
v. 
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS 
November 5, 1973 
rH. R. KHANNA , V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.] 
Payment of WaRes Act, 1936-S. 15(2)-Limitation when commences-
The date 011 which deduction from wages was made or tile date on whiah the pay. 
ment of wages was due to be made. 
Running allo1vance wlrether part of wages. 
The appellant, a Railway Guard, was convicted and sentenced for an offence 
under s. 509, l.P.C. 
The Higll Court upheld his convktion. On appeal this 
Court set aside the conviction and acquitted him. In the meanwhile the app:l· 
Jan~ was dismissed from service with effect from 31st March, 1956. Th~ appel-
lant impugned the order of dismissal in the High Court which held that his dis· 
missal was wholly void and ineffective. Thereupon the appellant was reinstated 
and was informed that the matter of his back wages for the period between 
the date of his dismissal and the date of reinstatenu:nt would be decided later. 
By another letter he was informed that this period was treated as lea,·e due. 
He was paid Rs. 81.51 as his wages for the entire period ending on March 7, 
1959. 
The nppellant made an application under s. 1S(2) of lhe Payment of Wages 
Act, 1936 claiming Rs. 9,016.60 plus ten times the said amount as compensation. 
In addition, he first claimed 'travelling allowance' but later sought to amend the 
applic~tion hv replacing 'travelling- allowance' by 'mnning allowance'. This 
was rejected by the Prescribed Authority. The Authority allowed a part of the 
claim but the appellant preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority under 
the Act. The Appellate Authority held that the claim was barred by time as 
limitation had commenced from the date of dismissal' from service and not from 
the date of reir.starement or the date on which it was decided to treat the period 
of dismissal as leave due. 
On the question ( i) whether the claim application filed by the appellant 
under s. 15(21 wns time-barred and (ii) whether he was entitled to running 
allowance. 
Allowing the appeal, 
HELD: (i) the first oroYiso to sub-ss. (2) of~. 15 indicates two lllternative 
st~rting roiuts for limbtion, nnmely, (i) the date on which deduction from 
wages w;•<> ffi3de o~ (ii) the dnte on which the p~yment of the wages was due 
to be made. 
[183-A] 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
E·ora a reading of s. 15 it is clear that the legislature bas deliberately used, 
first, in mb-s. (2) 3nd then in sub-s. (3 ). the expressions "d~duction of wages" 
G 
and ''dd:\y in payment of w:~ges~ as two distinct concepts. 
Terminus a quo (il 
in the proviso expr~ssly rel:ltes to the d~duction of wages, while (ii) is refer-
able to the cklayed wage8. !f both these terrninii were always relatable to the 
.~arne point of time, then there would be no point in mentioning terminus a quo 
(i) and the !egisl~ture could have simp1y s:~id that limitation for a clr.im under 
s. 15(21 wo11ld always start from the date on which the wages "fall due" or 
"accn.te" as has be~n done under Artid!' 102 cf the Limitation Act which 
applies onlv to suits for recovery of war,e~. The very fact that two distinct 
startin[! roir.'~ of limitntion referable to two distinct concepts have been stated 
H 
in the rrovi~o. ~haws !h~t the lc.clsl~ture had visualised that the date of deduc· 
tion of wl!gl's 
~ rul the dne date of delayed wages. may not always coincide. 
Conjunction "or'' which in the context means "either" and the phrase "as the 
ll 
c 
D 
E 
F 
H 
D. R. JAitRY v. U1'JO;o~ (Sarkaria, J.) 
179 
cas' nMY be" at the end of the orovi50 ure clinching indicia of Ibis interpreta-
tion. 1 ncy are not mere >Urp~njle$ ~nd must be gtven their full effect. The 
l~gislaturc IS not supposeJ tu JO<l\ugc 111 tautology; and when it uses enalogous 
words or phmscs .'" the altcr~atne. e51ch may be presumed to con,·ey a ,cpardiC 
and distinct meanm~. the choice of e1ther of which may involve tbc rejection of 
the olher. To hotc.J 
!~at tbc two expre,.ions "wages deducted'' and -~-Jges 
dcl~y~d" though used m the alttrnauvc. carry the same meaning, and in the 
prov1so are _utways_ rcfcmb1e to one and the same point of time, would be 
contrary to this pnmary canon of intcrpretntJOn. [1838-E] 
Ordinarily where an employee was dismissed on one <l•te and r<instateJ on 
another. the deduction of wages may synchronise with tbc :.ct of reinstatement. 
Jn the instant case the d,educllon dill not take place o• the d~tc of reimtntcment 
b<c:ar;e the order 

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