LexDIBYASINGH MALANA versus STATE OF ORISSA & ORS.
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A B c D E F G DIBYASINGH MALANA v. ST~TE OF ORISSA & ORS. APRIL 19, 1989 [E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND N.D. OJHA, JJ.] ' 'r· Orissa Land Reforms AGl, 1960: Section 37(b): 'family'- ~- Definition of_..:.'Major married son' whether entitled to benefit of· · statute. Proceedings were initiated in •1974 under the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960 for declaration of surplus land of the appellants. The appellants filed objections asserting, inter a/ia, that in view of the parti· tion in their families in the year 1965 the land in the ancestral properties which fell in their share could not be clubbed with those of their father. This contention was not accepted on the definition of the term "family" contained in section 37(b) of the Act. Such of the major married sons who as such had separated by partition before the 26th day of September, 1970, as contemplated by the definition of the term "family", were allotted separate ceiling units but so far as the appel· lants were concerned, their shares were clubbed with those of their father. The appellants, having failed to get relief in the appeals and revisions filed by them under the Act, challenged the orders passed by the various authorities in writ petitions before the High Court of Orissa which were dismissed, relying on its earlier Full Bench decision in Nityananda Guru v. State of Orissa, (A.I.R. 1983 Orissa 54). _..__ Before this Court it was contended that (1) the protection under Article 31(C) would not be available to section 37(b) of the Act and it would be hit by Article 14 unless it was established that it had nexus with the policy of the State towards securing any of the principles laid • down in Part IV of the Constitution; (2) section 37(h) of the Act had to be read in such a manner as to exclude the land which had fallen to the share of the appellants even though they did not fall within the category of "a major married son" as contemplated by the definition of the term "family" in that section, by adding the word "or" between the words ''major" and ''married", (3) the words "as such" qualify only "son" and not "major married son" and are meant to distinguish son from brother or uncle, etc. Dismissing the appeals, it was, 61t4 - - D.S. MALANA v. STATE OF ORJSSA 605 HELD: (1) The Act aims at agrarian reform and Section 37(b) A has a clear nexus with the policy of the State towards securing the principle laid down in Article 39(b) of the Constitution occmrring in Part IV thereof. [ 607E-F] Tumati Venkaish etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1980] 3 SCR , 1143; Seth Nand Lal & Anr. v. State of Haryana, [1980] 3 SCR 1181 B ''i'.'. and Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India, [1981] 2 SCR 1 referred to. ~ (2) It is ditlicnlt to take recourse to the suggested mode of in- terpretation of section 37(b), i.e., by adding the word "or" between the words "major" and "married" in view of its plain language. [608C-D] (3) On a plain reading of the definition of the term "family" in C + section 37(b) of the Act, the said definition as it stands is neither mean- ingless nor of doubtful meaning. [608F] British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Captain ltbar Singh & Ors., [1960] I SCR 168 referred to. D (4) Keeping in view the agrarian reform which was contemplated by the Act and particularly the provisions of Chapter IV relating to · .... ( ceiling and disposal of surplns land which were calculated to distribute the surplus land of big tenure holders among the overwhelming have- nots of the State, the Legislature in its wisdom gave an artificial mean- E ing to the term "family". [608F-G] (5) The main provision containing the definition of the term 'family' is to be found in the first part of section 37(b), namely "family , in relation to an individual means the individual, the husband or wife as "'· the case may be of such individual and their children whether major or F ... minor". The latter part of section 37(b), namely "but does not include a major married son who as such had separated by partition or otherwise before the 26th day of September 1970", does not on the face of its contain a matter which may in substance be treated as a fresh enactment adding something to the main provision but is apparently r and unequivocally a proviso containing an exception. This admits of no G - doubt in view of the words "but does not include". [608G-H; 609A-B] Comis~ioner of Income Tax, Mysore v. The Indo Mercantile
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