DHONDIBA GUNDU POMAJE & ORS. versus THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation: [1975] 2 S.C.R. 66 · Decided: 17-09-1974 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

DHONDIBA GUNDU POMAJE & ORS. 
v. 
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
September 17, 1974 
(P. }AGANMOHAN REDDY AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.] 
Practice and Procedure-Criminal appeal to High Court-Summary dismissal 
by High Coun-Duty 10 give reasons. 
Inasmuch as under the Constitution any person aggrieved by an order of 
the High Court can petition to the Supreme Court under Art. 136 for special 
leave, it is necessary, having regard to the long series of decisions beginning 
with [1953] S.C.R. 809, which discourage the practice of dismissal by the one. 
word 'dismissed', that the High Court should give some reasons why no .arguable 
case is made out on a perusal of the appeal petition and the judgment of the 
lower court. In the. absence of reasons. this Court can hold the dismissal to 
be justified or allow the appeal only after sending for the records, getting the 
paper books prepared, hearing the parties and appreciating lhe evidence. This 
process involves the Supreme Court being burdened with such aooeals and 
doing what the High Court should do. Furtller during such avoidablle delay 
the conviction person entertains a doubt about his conviction and suffers anxiety. 
f66H-67D] 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 325 
of 1974. 
A·ppeal by Special· leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 
.8th April, 1974 of. the Bombay High Court in Crl. Appeal No. 305 
of 1974. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Sharad 
Manchar, B. P. Maheshwari anxl Suresh Sethi, for the 
E 
appellants. 
S. B. Wad and M. N. Shr~fl. for the respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.-We have just now admiltted the special 
leave petition and after the appeal. was registered heard the learned 
F 
Advocates for the parties. This is yet another case jn which a criminal 
first appeal against a conviction has been dismissed summarily under 
Section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We h~1ve heard both 
sides. Mr. Wad for the State has strenuously contended that the High 
Court has power to dismiss summivi}y and has cited several decisions, 
but in all these cases there is nothing to the contrary to justify a view 
different from the one we are taking in this case. It is submitted that 
G 
the dismissal was so summary that even the record was not called for. 
No doubt, Section 421, Criminal Procedure Code does vest a power 
in the High Court to dismiss an appeal summarily but it can do so 
only on a perusal of the petition and the copy of the judgment. In-
asmuch as under our Constitution any person aggrieved by an order 
of the High Court can petition to this Court under Article 136 for 
special leave, it is not only necessary but having regard to the long 
H 
series of decisions beginning as far back as 1953 (see 1953 SCR 809) 
onwards which discourages this practice of dismissal by one word 
'dismissed', the High C.ourt should at least have given some reasons 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
D. o. POMAJE v. MAHARAsHTRA (laganmohan Reddy, /.) 
67 
why no arguable case is made out on a perusal of those documents. 
Since we are not in a position to ascertain and it is contended before 
us that arguable points do arise in this case in support of which the 
statement made in special leave petition has been read to us, we are 
not in a position to say that an arguable case does not arise. 
We 
would have been able to do so even if we had the slightest inkling 
in the order of the High Court. In the absence of any reasons what 
has been happening in many cases is that special leave is admitted, 
and after hearing the appeal if this Court has come to the conclusion 
that the conviction is valid, it has held that the dismissal by the High 
Court is justified. But this method, in our view, reverses the process 
and imposes unnecessary burden on this Court. What should have 
been done by the High Court, is now being done by this Court. It 
is only after sending for the records, getting the paper books prepared, 
hearing both parties in the appeal and after appreciation of the evi-
dence that it may be held that in some cases the dismissal~ in fact, 
was ultimately justified. In many cases the appeals were even allow-
ed. 
Long avoidable delay thus ensues during which the person convict-
ed entertains a doubt about his conviction and has to suffer 
the 
anxieiy caused thereby. 
We do hope and trust that the series of decisions over this long 
period disapproving of the practice of summarily dismissing by one 
word will be taken llote of and this Court wil

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