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DHIRENDRA KUMAR MANDAL versus THE SUPERINTENDENT AND REMEMBRANCER OF LEGAL AFFAIRS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER.

Citation: [1955] 1 S.C.R. 224 · Decided: 20-04-1954 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

r95"4 
Rohald.. WO;d 
M'atnams 
v. 
State Of Wtst' 
Bing al: 
Y tnkatarama 
l!yyitr Jc 
1954 
April 20. 
" 
" 
224 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[!955~ 
o~der dated 5tli August, 
1948, 
the "Privy 
council 
enlarged the scope of the appeal by permitting the 
appellant to raise the contention that there had been 
a contravention of section 257 of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code; 
These are the two points that arise for 
determination in his appeal. The question whetller 
sanction under sei;tion 197 wa:s necessary for instituting 
proceedings against the appellant on charges of conspi-
racy and of bribery; is now concluded by the decisions 
of the Judicial Committee in H. H. B. Gill v. The 
King(') and Phanindra Chandra Neogy v. The King( 2 )'. 
and" must be answered in the negative. The question 
whether there was contravention of section 257 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code 
and a denial or fair trial 
must, for the reasons" already given, be answered in 
the affirmative, and the convictionc of the appellant 
set aside on that ground. His appeal will also be 
allowed, and there will be an order of acquittal in his 
favour~ 
Appeal allowed. 
DHIRENDRA KUMAR MANDAL 
v; 
THE SUPERINTENDENT AND 
REMEMBRANCER OF LEGAL AFFAIRS TO 
THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL, 
AND ANOTHER. 
" ~MEHR CHAND 
MAHAJAN C.J., 
MuKHERJEA, VMAN 
BosE BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.1 
Constitution of 
India, 
Art. 14--Scope 
and construction of-
Meanin'g. of reasonable classification-C'rimina/" Procedure Code (A'ct 
V of 1898), ss. 269(1), 536-Notification under s. 269(1)-Validity 
of-Denial of the right to' be' tried by jury lo certai'n individuals-
Right retained· in t.he case of other indivi.duals committing the same 
or .. si'-rJ:iL:zr offetJces-D~fect i'n tri'al-Wheth-er .cured· bys .. 536. 
·Trial by j"Nry 
is 
undoubtedly one of the most vafuable rig)its 
wB.i.Ch an accused· can helve Out it -has .not been; guaranfeed Oy the 
ConStii:ufIC!n-. 
Sect~on· 269( 1) of the CodC· ·o( Criminal' Procedure· is ..___ )_ 
an: 'enabling· section and ernp0-Wers, the Stare Government- to. direct 
-
"M~IA~ 
.. 
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--
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S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
225 
that the trial of all' offences or of any particular class of offences 
before any Court of Session shall be by jury. It has the further 
power to revoke or alter such an order. There is nothing wrong if 
the State discontinues trial by jury in any district with regard to 
all or any particular class of offences. The section does not em-
power the State Government to direct that the trial of a particular 
case or of a particular accused person shall be by jury while the 
trial of other persons accused of the same· offence shall not be by 
jmy. The section does not envisage that persons 
accused of the 
same offence but involved in different cases can 
be 
tried 
by the 
Court of session by a different procedure namely some of them by 
jury and some of them with the help of assessors. 
The ambit of 
the power of revocation 
or 
alteration 
is co-extensive with the 
power conferred by the opening words of the section and cannot go 
beyond those words. 
The impugned notification of the year 1947 revoking the pre-
vious two notifications had denied to certain individuals the right 
to be tried by jury while retaining that right in the case 
of other 
individuals who had committed the same or similar 
offences and 
thus it had travelled beyond the powers conferred 
on the 
State 
Government by section 269( I) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
and was thus void and inoperative. 
The impugned notification also contravened the provisions 
of 
articie 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as 
the classification was 
not based on some real and substantial distinction 
bearing a just 
and reasonable relation to the objects sought to be attained but 
was made arbitrary and without any substantial basis. 
The impugned notification did not in express terms indicate 
the grounds on which this set of cases had been segregated from 
other sets of cases falling under the same sections of the Indian 
Penal Code. 
The classification as formulated by the High Court had no re-
lation to the object in view, that is, the withdrawal of jury trial 
in these cases. 
· 
The contention that the defect in the trial, if any, was cured 
by section 536 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as this objection 
was not taken in the trial Court, was without force as section 536 
postulates irregularities at the trial after the commenceme

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