DHANJIBHAI RAMJIBHAI versus STATE OF GUJARAT

Citation: [1985] 2 S.C.R. 632 · Decided: 22-01-1985 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.S. PATHAK · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

632 
DHANJIBHA! RAMJIBHAI 
v. 
STATE OF GUJARAT 
January 22, 1985 
[R.S. PATHAK, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND V.B. ERADI, JJ.] 
Service /aw-Tennlnation simpliciter of the services of a probationer with· 
out confirming him after allowing hin1 to continue after the initial period of 
Probation-Right to confirmation-The termination cannot be set to be as ma/a 
fide or in violation. of provisions of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Consitution-
Constitution of India, Article 136-lnierference by the Supreme Court. 
The services of the appellent who was appointed to the post of Sales Tax 
Officer, by an order dated March 22, 1972 on probation for a p.:riod of two years; 
but continued thereafter in service without any order confirming him in his 
appointment were terminated on March 31, 1975. The writ petitL·n filed in the 
High Court of Gujarat, chailenging the said termination was dismissed, by a 
judgment dated April 21, 1976. Finding no basis for the allegation of ma/a fide 
on facts the court held that there was no right to confirmation on the expiry of 
the period of probation, and therefore, there was no violation of the provisions 
of Clause (2) Article 311 of the Constitution. An appeal filed by the appellant 
was dismissed by the Division Bench, on March 28, 1977. Hence the appeal, by 
special leave 1Jf the Court. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, 
HELD 1.1. The allegation of mala fides is wholly baseless and has not 
been established. Where a finding of fact has been rendered by a learned Single 
Judge of the High Court as a Court of first instance and thereafter affirmed in 
appeal by an Appellate Bench of that High Court, the Supreme Court should be 
reluctant to interfere with the finding unless there is very strong reasan to do so. 
[635C-D] 
2.1 When the order of appointment recited that the appe11ant would be 
on probation for a period of two years, it conformed to Rule 5 of the Recruitment 
Rules which prescribes such period of probation. Under the Rule the period of 
probation may be extended in accordance with the rules, The period of two 
years specified in the Rule is merely the initial period for which an officer may be 
appointed on probation and does not represent the maximum Period of probation 
In terms of the said rule the period of probation may be extended. [635E·F) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
f 
F 
G 
H 
• 
DHANJJBHAI v. GUJARAT (Pathak, J.) 
633 
2.2 The power to extend the period of probation must not be confused 
with the manner in which the extension may be effected. The one relates to power, 
~ the other to mere procedure. Merely because procedural ru'es have not been fram· 
ed does not imply a negation of the power. In the absence of any rule indicating 
the manner for extending the period of probation, it is sufficient that the poweJ 
is exercised fairly and reasonably, having regard to the context in which the 
power has been granted. [635G-Hl 
3.1 There is no question of any legitimate expectation of being confirmed 
or even right to confirmation on the expiry of two years of probation and on 
successfully completing the qualifying tests and training undergpne by a Govern-
ment employee. It was open to the StateGovernment to consider the entire record 
of service rendered by its employee ahd to determine whether he was suitable for 
confirmation or his services should be terminated. The function of confirmation 
implies the exercise of judgment of the confirming authori,y on the overall 
suitability of the e1nployee for permanent absorption in service. [636A-B] 
3.2 The contention that the appellant should have been heard before his 
services were terminated is not correct since the order of termination does not 
,,, contain any stigma or refer to any charge of misconduct on the part of the appel-
--.1. 
]anti.and the tennination was on the basis of an overal_I appreciation of bis record 
of service disentitling him to be absorbed in the service. (6360; F) 
3.3. No distinction lies between a probationer whose services are termina-
ted on the expiry of two years and a probationer who has completed the normal 
span of two years and whose services ar~ terminated some time later after he has 
put in a further period of service. It is perfectly possible that during the initial 
period of probation the confirming authority may be unable to reach a definite 
conclusion on whether the candidate!should be confirmed or his services should be 
terminated. Such candidate may be allowed to continue beyond the in

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