DHAN SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC. versus STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.

Citation: [1990] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 423 · Decided: 05-12-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: L.M. SHARMA · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

' 
DHAN SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC. 
v. 
STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 
DECEMBER 5, 1990 
A 
(LALIT MOHAN SHARMA AND M. FATHIMA BEEVI, JJ.) 
8 
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 16, 309--Amendments 
to Rules 2 and 4(ii) of Punjab Government National Emergency (Con-
cession) Rules, 1965-Classification-Persons who joined before/dur-
ing emergency-Reasonableness and validity of-Government's power 
to amend the Rules and to withdraw concessions-Interference of C 
Court-When. 
The Punjab Government National Emergency (Concession) 
Rules, 1965: Ru/es 2 and 4(ii)-Constitutional validity· of-Benefit of 
military service-Those who joined before proclamation of emergency 
-Whether entitled to, 
D 
The appellants and petitioners are ex-servicemen re-employed in 
U1e senice of Respondent State. They served the Indian Army during 
emergency from 1962 to 1968. ;\ppellants 4, S, 7 and 8 joined theArmy 
dud'1!1 emergency while the other appellants and writ petitioners joined 
before the emergency. Certain benefits like increments, seniority, 
E· 
l!l!nsion etc .. were extended to such. persons by the Respondent-State by 
adopt1'1!1 the Pwtjab Government National Emergency (Concessions)-
RQles, 1965. However, by notifications dated22.3.1976, 9.8.1976 and 
S. U .1976 certain amendments to Rules 2 and 4 were introduced by the 
Respondent State with retrospective effect from 1.11 • .1966 resulting in 
denial of st1ch benefits to them. Some of the amendmeLts were cha!· F 
lenged before this Coim and were declared ultra vi res the Constitution of 
India. 
On 4.8.1986 the Respondent-State issued instructions to the effect 
that tl)e ex-servicemen employees who joined the Civil Service after the 
lss11,e of the notifications would continue to be governed by the same. G 
The appellants and some of the writ petitioners who had joined govern-
ment service since December 1976 were denied the benefits under· the 
Rules, since under the amended Rules only those who were enrolled or 
coml)lissioned· during emergency were eligible for such benefits, and·not 
those wiio joined the Army before the emergency. 
H 
423 
A 
B 
c 
424 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 
The Writ Petition filed by the appellants before the High Court 
was dismissed and they have preferred the present appeal. The Writ 
Petitioners admittedly joined the Army before the emergency, have 
directly challenged the notifications in this Court. 
It has been conteuded'inter alia-that the amendment confining the 
military service to those who joined during emergency and denying the 
same to those who joined prior to the emergency was unreasonable and 
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and 
that the differential treatment meted out to persons who joined earlier 
and were released later, but served during emergency, amounts to 
denial of equal opportunity in the matter of employment and thus viola-
tive of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 
Allowing the appeal in part, and dismissing the Writ Petitions, 
this Court, 
HELD: 1. The State could amend the Rules and withdraw the 
D 
concession in exercise of the power conferred under Article 309 of the 
Constitution. It is open to the State to lay down any rule for determin-
ing seniority in service and the Court cannot interfere unless it results in 
inequality of opportunity among the employees belonging to the same 
class. When a rule is challenged as denying equal protection, the ques-
tion for determination by the Court is not whether it has resulted in 
F 
inequality but whether there is some difference which bears a just and 
reasonable relation to the object of legislation. Mere differentiation or 
inequality of protection does not per se amount to discrimination within 
the inhibition of equal protection clause under Article 14. To attract the 
attention of the clanse, it is necessary to show that the selection or 
differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary and that it does not rest on 
F 
any rational basis having regard to the object which the Legislature has 
in view. The Court has to examine whether the classification can be 
deemed to rest upon differentia discriminating the persons or things 
grouped from those left out and whether such differentia has a reaon-
able relation to the objects sought to be achieved irrespective of whether 
the rule is intended to apply to person or thing or to a certain class of 
G 
persons or things. Therefore, the policy or the object of the

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