LexDEWAN SINGH versus CHAMPAT SINGH & ORS.
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B D £ F G 'H 903 DEWAN SINGH v. CHAMPAT SINGH & ORS. October 17, 1969 [J. C. SHAH AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.] Limitalion Act (9 of 1908), Art. 158-Limitation for setting midc awGrd-Co1nnJence1nent of-Decide in '1vluttever manner' he 1nay think- Whether enables arbitrator to ilnport personal knowledge-High Court txerclsing revisional powers-Discretion of Supre1ne Court to interfere in appe3l by special leave uttder Art. 136. Disputes between the appellant and the first respondent were re'erred to five arbitrators as per the agreement entered into between the parties. The agreement provided that the decision could be arrived at by the arbi· trators 'in Vlhatever manner' they think. The arbitrators made their award, on the basis of their personal knowledge. The appellant filed a suit for passing a decree in terms of the award on November 1, 1955. Though the respondents bad notice of the suit, they had no notice of the filing of the award into court. The respondent filed his written statement on February 3, 1956, challenging the validity elf the award on cer- tain grounds. While the first appellate court held that the arbitration agreement empowered the arbitra~'Jrs to import their personal knowledge, the High Court, in revision held that it did not so empower, tha~ the award was vitiated by legal misconduct, and that the objection to the award by the respondent was not barred by time. In appeal to this Court, HELD: (1) Article 158 of the Limitation Act, 1908, gives to the party 30 days time for applying to set aside an award from the date of tlie service of the notice of filing of the award. Since there !was no such notice, the objection by the respondent was within time. [905 G-H] (2) Parties to an agreement of .. eference may include in it such clauses as they think fit, except those prohibited by law, but the phrase 'in what- ever manner' they think does not mean that the arbitrators can decide the disputes on the basis of their personal knowledge. Further, arbitrators must act in accordance with the principles of nature1_ justice, and inform the parties to the submission about the nature of their persoal knowledge but in the pre;ent case, it was not done so. [906 F-G; 907 A-B, C-E] C/umdris v. I>-brandtsen Moller Co. Inc., [!951] K. B. 240, referred to. (3) The decision of the High Court being eminently just, this Court will not interfere with it under Art. 136 of the Constitution, assuming that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional powers, could not have correct· ed the first appellate court's interpretation. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDIC1ION: Civil Appeal No. 1369 of 1966. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 11, 1962 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 653 of 1959. 904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970] 2 s.c.R. G. N. Dikshit, 0. P. Saini and Lakshmi Chand Tyagi, for the appellant. J. P. Goyal and S. N. Singh, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. This appeal by special leave arises from an arbi- tration proceeding. The appellant, the 1st respondent and one Sukh Lal who died during the pendency of these proceedings referred their disputes to five arbitrators as per the written agree- ment executed by them on September 9, 1955. Arbitrators made their award on October 11, 1955. They duly served on the parties to the arbitration agreement, notice of making and signing . the award. The award was thereafter registered... On Novem- ber 1, 1955 the appellant filed a suit in the court of Munsiff Hawaii Meerut praying that the award in question be made a rule of the court and decree passed in accordance with the same. It is said that the notice taken in that suit could not be personally served on the defendants as they refused to accept the same. That fact was reported to the court by the process server as per his report dated 19-11-1955. Thereafter the defendant£ filed their "ritten statement on February 3, 1956 wherein they challenged 1~.e validity of the award on various grounds. They contended that the award was vitiated because of misconduct on the part of tlle arbitrators inasmuch as the arbitrators decided the. disputes referred to them primarily on the basis of their personal know- ledge. They also contended that the arbitration agreement was )btained from them by exercise of undue influence. Their further coi..'.'ntion was that the subject matter of the. d
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