DEVILAL AND OTHERS versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Citation: [2021] 1 S.C.R. 592 · Decided: 25-02-2021 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: UDAY UMESH LALIT · Disposal: Disposed off

cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
592
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2021] 1 S.C.R.
   [2021] 1 S.C.R. 592
592
DEVILAL AND OTHERS
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No. 989 of 2007)
FEBRUARY 25, 2021
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, INDIRA BANERJEE AND
K. M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302 r/w 34 – Appellants convicted
u/ss.302 r/w 34, sentenced to life imprisonment – Affirmed by High
Court – On appeal, held: FIR was rightly relied upon by the courts
below as dying declaration of the victim-deceased – FIR itself
referred to the presence of PW1 (wife of deceased) and PW2 (sister-
in-law of the deceased) – Testimony of both these witnesses disclosed
that the appellants opened an assault on victim which led to his
death – Recoveries of the weapons in question viz., lathi, sword
and axe also lend sufficient corroboration to the prosecution’s case
– Conviction and sentence recorded by the courts below, insofar as
the two appellants are concerned, affirmed – Third appellant ‘AR’,
though is also guilty of the offence charged, but was juvenile in
terms of the 2000 Act thus, the sentence of life imprisonment imposed
upon him is set aside – Matter remitted to Juvenile Justice Board
for determining appropriate quantum of fine to be levied on him –
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 – s.20
–Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – ss.3(1)(10), 3(2)(5).
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
– s.20 – Effect of – Discussed.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The incident in the present case had occurred
in July, 1998 when the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (the 1986 Act)
was in force. The age of juvenility for a male juvenile under the
1986 Act was 16 years. Since ‘AR’ was 16 years 11 months as on
the date when the offence was committed, he was certainly not a
juvenile within the meaning of 1986 Act. However, the age of
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
593
DEVILAL AND OTHERS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
juvenility was raised to 18 years in terms of the provisions of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (the
2000 Act). Section 20 of the 2000 Act dealing with proceedings
pending against a juvenile on the date the 2000 Act came into
force. Where an offender was more than 16 years of age on the
day when the incident had occurred (and therefore was not a
juvenile within the meaning of the 1986 Act) but was less than 18
years of age on the day of the incident, the question as to what
extent benefit can be given in terms of the provisions of the 2000
Act, was considered by this Court in some cases. Thus, even if it
is held that ‘AR’ was guilty of the offence with which he was
charged, the matter must be remitted to the jurisdictional Juvenile
Justice Board for determining appropriate quantum of fine that
should be levied on ‘AR’. [Para 15, 16 and 18][602-G-H;
603-A-B, F-G; 609-A-B]
Mumtaz alias Muntyaz vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (now
Uttarakhand (2016) 11 SCC 786 : [2016] 3 SCR 434;
Satya Deo alias Bhoorey vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
(2020) 10 SCC 555 – relied on.
1.2 The testimony of PW9-Doctor, shows that victim-
deceased (‘G’) was alive when the initial examination was
undertaken by PW9. According to the witness, when he examined
‘G’, the blood pressure could not be detected. However, that by
itself does not mean that the ‘G’s not in a physical condition to
make any reporting to the police two hours earlier. Paragraph 24
of the deposition of PW9 shows that if the symptoms stated therein
were present, it could possibly be said that the concerned person
would not be in a position to speak. First of all, such assertion is
purely an opinion of an expert. Secondly, nothing is available on
record to show that ‘G’ had shown these symptoms either soon
after the incident or when his statement was recorded by PW8.
No questions were put to PW1, PW2 and PW8 in that behalf. The
submission advanced on this score is therefore, rejected and it
is found that the FIR was rightly relied upon by the courts below
as dying declaration on part of ‘G’. The FIR itself referred to the
presence of PW1 and PW2. The substantive testimony of both
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
594
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2021] 1 S.C.R.
these witnesses clearly discloses that the appellants had opened
an assault on ‘G’ which led to his death. The assertion on part of
PW1 that her earlier statement recorded during investigation
was read over to her does not mean that she was tutored to follow
t

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.