LexDEVIDAYAL ROLLING MILLS versus PRAKASH CHIMANLAL PARIKH AND ORS.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
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DEVIDA Y AL ROLLING MILLS
A
v.
PRAKASH CHIMANLAL PARIKH AND ORS.
MARCH 24, 1993
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(N.M. KASLIWAL AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.J
B
Constitutio.n of India, 1950:
Articles 136, 142-Special Leave Petitiol>-lnvolving tenancy of proper-
ty-Petition dismissed-Interlocutory application by third party after 12 yean c
alleging title to said property and fraud in transaction relating rhereto--Held
application cannot be entertained in exercise of powers either under Article
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136 or Article 142 or under Section 47 C.P.C. in disposed of Special Leave
Petition.
Father of respondents no.I and 2 was the owner of the plot in dispute D.
and respondent no.3 was the tenant therein. Respondents no.1 and 2, after
the death of their father, obtained a decree for eviction against respondent
no.3. In the execution proceedings the petitioners (in S.L.P. No.492Sn7)
intervened contending that they bad purchased the business along With
interest in the property in dispute from respondent no.3. They filed a E
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declaratory suit for being declared tenant in the said property. Their
application for interim injunction to restrain respondents 1 and 2 from
executing the decree was rejected and the revision thereupon was also
dismissed by the High Court. Their special leave petition was dismissed
on 13.12.1977. However, respondents no. I and 2 agreed not to execute the
decree before l.1.1980 on the undertakings to be given by the petitioners F
and respondent no. 3. Later, an application was filed for declaring the
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order dated 13.12.1977 as complied with inasmuch as the petitioners and
respondent no.3 had handed over the possession of the property to
Respondents no.1 and 2. It was also stated that a fresh tenancy bad been
granted in favour of the petitioners with effect from 25.6.1978. As no G
objection was filed, the prayer was allowed by this Court's order dated
11.12.1978.
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Another company (the applicant company) filed the Interlocutory
Application on 23.1.1990 in the dismissed S.L.P. no.492Sn7 stating that the
property in dispute belonged to a private limited company ofwbicb respon· H
611
612
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{1993) 2 S.C.R.
A
dents no.l and 2 were the only directors; that by an agreement of sale dated
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31.7.1979 the applicant company purchased 100% shares of the company
of respondents no.l and 2 and took OV!'I" the entire estates of the said
company. It was contended that the property in dispute being the property
of the company, shares ofwbich were purchased by the applicant company,
B respondents 1 & 2 had no right and authority to create fresh tenancy in +
favour of the petitioners on 25.6.1978; that respondents no.l ·and 2 prac·
tised a fraud upon this Court in obtaining the order dated 11.12.1978 b)
making a false representation that they were owners of the property in
dispute. It was prayed inter alia that the applicant-company be impleaded
as respondent no.4 in S.L.P. No. 4925n7, the order.dated 11.12.1978 be
c recalled and an order of Inquiry about the fraud practised upon this Court
be made.
This Court by its order dated 2.4.1990 directed the High Court to
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decide the question oftitle to the property In dispute and submit its findings
D to this Court. The High Court held that the property in dispute belonged to
respondents no.l and 2 and the applicant company was not the owner. The
applicant company filed objections to the findings recorded by the High
Court and the petitioners filed a counter to applicant's objections.
The petitioners raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability
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of the application (I.A. No.l of 1990) contending that the interlocutory "'
application In the dismissed special leave petition could not be filed by the
applicant company under any provision of law after a lapse of more than 12
years; that besides the lease dated 25.6.1978 never being the subject matter
of any proceedings, the applicant company was never a party to the suit or
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the proceedings arising out of it and giving rise to the special leave petition.
The applicant company contended that the application was main·
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tainable under Section 47 C.P.C and/or under Articles 136 and 142 of the
Constitution inasmuch this Court has appellate powers from every
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decisio11 or .Very Court or Tribunal and Article 142 gives power to this
Court to do justice In any cause or matter raised even in a special leave
petition already disposed of; that tExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.