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DELHI TRANSPORT UNDERTAKING versus BALBIR SARAN GOEL

Citation: [1970] 3 S.C.R. 757 · Decided: 23-02-1970 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.C. SHAH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
DELHI TRANSPORT UNDERTAKING 
v. 
BALBIR SARAN GOEL 
February 23, 1970 
[J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.] 
7 5 'I 
Delhi Road Transport Authority Act, 1950-Conditions of Appoint-
111ent and Service Regulations, 
1952, Reg. 9, 15 & 17-En1ployee un~ 
successfully approacViing Court, without exhausting depar11nental 
renze~ 
dies-Simpliciter order 
terminating 
seri•ices 
as no longer 
required-
JVhether by way of Punishn1ent. 
Regulation 9 df the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act (Conditions 
of . ..\ppointment and Service Regulations), 1952 provides for ,termination 
oi services in two modes. The first is by its clause (a) by ¥:hich services 
may be terminated without any notice or pay in lieu of notice. This can 
be done among other reasons for misconduct. The second mode is by 
clause (b) by which the services may be terminated owing to reduction of 
establishment or in circumstances other than those mentioned in clause 
(al which relate to termination without notice. 
When termination is 
made under clause (b) one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof is to be 
gi,·en to the employee. 
Regulation 15 says that a breach of the standing 
order will amount to misconduct, and one of the penalties_ imposed. for 
nlisconduct is dismissal. 
It also prohibits an order of dismissal, reflloval 
or other punishment except censure unless 
the procedure laid down ·in 
clouse (c) of Regulation 15 is followed. 
The standing order 17 enjoins 
that no employee should have recourse to a court of law without first re-
sorting to the normal official channels of redress. 
1-hc respondent. an cn1ployec of the appellant-J]ndertaking establish-
ed under the Delhi Transport Authority Act, was demoted. 
He challeng-
ed the demotion by filing a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 
Thereafter the appellant-undertaking 
passed an order terminating 
the 
respondent's services, stating only that his services were no longer required 
ttn<l that one inonth's salary in lieu o'f notice would be paid. The respon· 
<li.:-nt filed a suit claiming that the order \Vas illegal. On the questions, 
( i l whether the respondent's services could be terminated under Regula-
tion 9(b) without complying v1ith the procednre pr:escribed l;>y Regulation 
15. and (ii) whether although the or<ler was made in perfectly harmless 
and innocuous terms and purporting to be within Regulation 9(b) it was 
a mere camouflage for inflicting punishment for breach of standing order 
J 7. as the respondent had approached the High Court without exhausting 
the Departmental remedies. this Court. 
HELD : (i) Even if it be assun1e<l that the. law is t~e same as would 
be applicablf to, a case governed by· Art. 311. 1t w3:s d1fficu_It to say that 
the services of the respondent ~·ere not merely ~e~rm1nated . 1n accordance 
~·ith Regulation 9(b) which governed the cond_ltLons _of his employment. 
It n1av be that the motive for termination of ht~ service~ was the bre~ch 
o'f St:inding Order 17 i.e. of filing a writ petition in th~ High Court aga1!1st 
the demotion without exhausting departmental re~ed1e5 but the questI}~ 
of motive is immaterial. No charge-sheet was prefe,rred under hRegud a 
ti on 15 nor was any enqUiry held in accord~bce t~:tif'
1i~e b:!~~~ntd;n~ h!~ 
under Regulation 9(b) was maded. It lmfiaj 
~n the part of the authority 
successfully pleaded 
and prove 
1na a ' es 
758 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1970) 3 S.C.R. 
terminating his services the impugned order could be legitimately challeng-
ed but no foundation was laid in that behalf in the pfaint nor was the 
question of malafides investigated by the courts below. (763 E-G] 
(ii) As regards the punishment having been inflicted for misconduct 
the order being a mere camouflage no such question 
could arise in 
the 
present case. 
Regulation 9(b) clearly empowered the authorities to termi-
nate the se·rvices after giving one month's notice or pay in lieu of notice. 
The order was unequivocally made in terms of that Regulation. Even if 
the employers of the respondent thought thaf he was a cantankerous per-
son and it was not desirable to retain him in service it was open to them 
to terminate his services in terms of Regulation 9(b) and it was not neces-
sary to dismiss him by way of punishment for misconduct. If the em-
p]oyer chooses to terminate the services in accordance with clause ( b) of 
Regulation 9 after giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof it 
cannot amo

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