DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY versus SUNIL KHATRI & ORS.
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A B C D E F G H 68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SUNIL KHATRI & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 3862 of 2022) MAY 19, 2022 [HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.] Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s. 24(2) – Land acquisition proceedings, when deemed to have lapsed – Land of the respondents notified u/s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as required for the planned development of Delhi vide notification dated 25.11.1980 – Declaration u/s. 6 published and the award passed – Initiation of acquisition process vide notifications dated 5.11.1980 and 25.11.1980 – Challenge to, in various writ petitions – High Court granted interim order of stay of dispossession – Numerous litigation continued – Meanwhile, 2013 Act came into force – Application filed in the pending writ petition – Allowed by the High Court holding that the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed by virtue of s.24(2) – On appeal, held : Since the entire notification was quashed by the High Court in Gurdip Singh and Balbir Singh, thus, the State could not take possession on the basis of quashed notification – However, before the judgments of this Court were pronounced in the year 1999 or 2000, the land owner had obtained stay of dispossession – Thus, it is not a stay of dispossession pending notification u/s. 6 or award u/s. 11-A but the acquisition of the entire land which came to be settled by this Court – Thus, the State could not take possession on the basis of a notification u/s. 6 leading to the award in 1987 – There was no stay but the acquisition itself stood quashed – When the 2013 Act came into force on 01.01.2014, the five years period had not lapsed which was stay free or free from setting aside of the acquisition – Appellant was prevented by the interim orders in a number of writ petitions filed to take possession – Thus, prior to the commencement of 2013 Act, there was no stay free period of 5 years which could lead to a declaration that the proceedings stand lapsed – Notifications u/s. 6 quashed on 15.5.1989 and 17.12.1996 were set aside in Gurdip Singh Uban-I and II’s case but before that, there was an order of stay of [2022] 4 S.C.R. 68 68 A B C D E F G H 69 dispossession granted in favour of the land owner on 27.9.1999 – Thus, on account of setting aside of notification u/s. 6, the State could not take possession in view of the orders passed by the High Court – Thus, order passed by High Court is set aside. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 In the writ petition filed by the land owners, there was an interim order of stay granted on 9.7.1999, even before Gurdip Singh Uban-I was decided on 20.8.1999. The notifications under Section 6 of the Act which were quashed became effective only after the order of this Court in Gurdip Singh Uban-I and II. The land owner strangely made no mention of the judgment delivered on 22.4.1997 in Abhey Ram. The order of stay of dispossession in the writ petition filed by the land owner continued when the 2013 Act came into force. The land which was the subject matter of challenge in Gurdip Singh Uban was also at Village Chattarpur, even before the Award was announced. There was an interim order of stay of dispossession on 28.4.1986 in respect of land situated in the village Chattarpur which continued till such time the notification under Section 6 of the Act was quashed relying upon Balbir Singh decided on 15.05.1989 and Sudan Singh. This order was set aside by this Court on 20.8.1999 in Gurdip Singh Uban I. The land owner had got stay in their writ petition on 9.7.1999. Thus, there was no stay free period of 5 years before coming into force of the 2013 Act. [Para 21][83- B-E] 1.2. It is to be noted that since the entire notification was quashed by the High Court in Gurdip Singh and Balbir Singh, therefore, the State could not take possession on the basis of quashed notification. But before the judgments of this Court were pronounced in the year 1999 or 2000, the land owner had obtained stay of dispossession. Therefore, it is not a stay of dispossession pending notification under Section 6 or award under Section 11- A but the acquisition of the entire land which came to be settled by this Court. Thus, the State could not take possession on the basis of a notification under Section 6 leading to the award on 05.06.1987. The argument that there was no stay from the date of the award till the stay was grante
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