LexDELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY versus DURGA CHAND KAUSHISH
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A B ( c D E F G If DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ~. DURGA CHAND KAUSHISH August 28, 1973 (K. K. MATHEW AND M. H. BEG, JJ.] Dtrd--C 01&structio11 of. 535 The Secretary of State for India had entered into a lease with the respondent ·in 1931. 'J'he lease was for a term of ninety years. The leased land was cntrust- (d for management on behalf of the Government of India to the Delhi Improve· ment Trust and thereafter after abolition of the Trust to .the appellant, the Delhi Development Authority. The lessee had paid a permiulii. in considerat!on of the lc""'i and had agreed to pay an annual rent of Rs. 465 /- for the duration of the· lease. Covenant 9 of the deed provided· that "_the lessor. will at the request and ccist of the l~'e at the end of the term hereby granted and so on from time to time theif-aftef -at t~ end of each &uch successive further ter1n of years as shall be granted .. execute to the lessee a new lease of the premises demised by way of renewal for 20 ·years at the first renewal and 20' years for the second renewal and 30 years for· the third renewal. The proviso to covenant 9 stipulated "that of each such rCnewed term of "years as shall be granted shall not with the original term of the years· and any previous renewals exceed in the aggregate the period of ninety years... Covenant 10 made the rent subject to enhancement on the st:cond renewal. The appellant enhanced thC rent "tluring the period.. of ninety ynrs and demanded arrears of rent. The respondent then sued for a declaration · that the annual rent payable by him could not be enhanced during_ the subsis· tence of the lease·. · The High Court decreed the suit. In the appeal to this Court it was contended that the proviso to covenant 9 made the -enhancement clause operative within the admitted l.'eriod of the lease of ninety years bacause t9e "original ternt" mentioned therein not only stood for the initi3t ninety years but after the expiry of the. first period of ninety years. [54J.F] Dismissing the appeal, HELD : That on an interpretation of the Jease deed on its own languag!:· and ter~s the enhancement clause could only o~rate upon the grant of a fresh lease after the e:xpiry of the first period of ninety years. [541 F] The initial term of lease of ninety years could not exist with the renewal of that very lease within ninety years. A renewal of a leaese is really a grant of a ~resh lease. .I~ as the words in covenant 9 clearly signify enhancement of rint 1S D_lade cond1t~o!1~l .upon. grant of a fresh lease, it could only take place on .the expiry of the initial lease. and not before ~hat i.im.e. [5J8G1 The_ f!!~aning of the words "original term" as used in the proviso could not be the 1n1tt1?1 term of 90 yea.rs because if that is added to the periods of rer,e\val of lease the total must obviously and necessarily exceed 90 years. It is quite natutal to r~trict this express~on used in the context of renewals to a term of re~wal. This would be a log1cal course to adopt as the whole covenant 9 deals with rene\vals of leases. The difficulty in tearing the few words in the proviso aw~y from ~e cont~xt of the_ rest of the covenant as well as from all other parts of the d~ IS, f!:tat it could, ~f that were. d_o_ne override not merely the words of the demi~,. gi~ng the duration of the initial lease as ninety years, but would also conflic_t with the contents of covenant 9 itself. Nothing in the proviso to. CO\o~nt 9 couJd reasonably be used t<? destroy the meanin~ of the unambiguous. operung word"i of -the covenant showing that the Whole covenant is meant to,. ope_rate only ••at tiie end of the. term hereby granted''. The meaning of a docu- mlnt r°[1 of a particular ~art of it IS to be sought for in the document itself This ru e o ows from the · hteral rule of construction which n1 · 1 · · · produces absurd results must be resOrted to f\rst. f)42E; ~] ess Its app icabon 536 SUPREME COURT REPOJ\TS [1974] 1 S.C.R. Monypenny v. Mo11ype11ny 1861 9 H.L.C 114 and Re Meredith ex. p. Chick [1879j 11 Cb. d 731, referred to .. The proviso to covenant 9 could be said to suffer from the vice of an un- certainty which can only be removed by ignoring the words creating this un- certainty. In such a case the ambiguous words can be disregarded so that the terms cf the earlier operative part of the demise, which are clear, must prevail. [544B] Snu. Bina Das Gupta und Others v. Sachindra M
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