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DELHI ADMINISTRATION versus GURDIP SINGH UBAN AND ORS. ETC.

Citation: [1999] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 650 · Decided: 20-08-1999 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SUJATA V. MANOHAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
DELHI ADMINISTRATION 
v. 
GURDIP SINGH UBAN AND ORS. ETC. 
AUGUST 20, 1999 
[SUJATA V. MANOHAR AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ.] 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Sections 4(1), 5A, 6-Quashing of the 
declaration under Section 6 in certain cases by the High Court on the 
groundΒ· that Section 5A inquiry was vitiated-Subsequently respondents 
-
C claiming in another writ petition that such quashing would also enure to 
their benefit despite not having filed objections under Section SA-Held, in 
respect of those who did not object to Section 4(1) notification by filing 
objections under Section 5A, the said notification and declaration under 
Section 6 therein must be deemed to be in force-Quashing the notification 
D in the cases of individual writ petitions cannot be treated as quashing the 
1 
whole of it. 
A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued 
on 25-11-1980 in respect of 50,000 bighas of land in 13 villages in Delhi. A 
declaration under Section 6 was published around 5 years later, on 7-6-1985. 
E The said declaration under Section 6 was challenged by way of several writ 
petitions in the High Court. On reference, the Full Bench by its order dated 
25-7-1987 upheld the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration made 
under Section 6. The Full Bench negatived the contention that the declaration 
was time barred having been issued more than 3 years after the notification. 
It held that the scheme for which the land was acquired was an integrated one 
F and the stay orders even if obtained in individual cases necessarily resulted 
in precluding any further proceedings under Section 6. The said petitions 
were sent back to the Division Bench for decision on the other points raised. 
The Division Bench by its judgment dated 18-11-88 allowed the writ petitions 
thereby quashing the Section 6 declaration. The said judgment was not 
G appealed against by the Delhi Administration. 
H 
Another writ petition was filed before the High Court on 23-4-1986 for 
quashing the aforesaid notification dated 25-11-1980 and the declaration 
dated 7-6-1985. The Division Bench by its judgment dated 17-12-1996 allowed 
the said writ petition. It held that the earlier judgment dated 18-11-1988 
650 
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,, 
DELHI ADMINIST. v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN 
651 
resulted in the entirety of the Section 6 declaration being quashed and was A 
a judgement in rem and hence the petitioners therein could rely on that 
judgment even though they had not filed any objections under Section SA. 
Against the aforesaid judgement, the Delhi Administration has preferred the 
present appeals. 
On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that the result of Section B 
6 declaration being quashed would be that the Section 4(1) notification would 
also lapse. It was further contended that in a similar case decided by a Three 
Judge Bench in respect of the same group of notifications it was held that 
in the case of owners who had not filed objections under Section SA, they 
could not take advantage of the judgment of the Division Bench dated 18-11- C 
1988; and that upon a proper understanding of the judgment of the Division 
Bench dated 18-11-88, it could not be held that the entirety of the Section 
6 notification stood quashed by tl:e said judgement. 
On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the notification 
could not remain partially stayed or partially suspended and it was clear D 
from the language employed in judgment of the Division Bench dated 18-11-
1988 that the entire Section 6 declaration had been quashed. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD : J. J. Quashing the notification in the case of individual writ E 
petitions cannot be treated as quashing the whole of it. In connection with 
owners or persons interested who have not filed objections under section SA 
of the Land Acquisition Act in principle, it must be accepted that they had 
no objection to Section 4 notification operating in respect of their property. 
On the other hand, in respect of those who filed objections, they might have 
locus standi to contend that Section SA inquiry was not conducted properly. 
Those who have not filed objections under Section SA could not be allowed 
to contend that the Section SA inquiry was bad and that consequently Section 
6 declaration.must be struck down and that the Section 4 notification would 
lapse. In respect of those who did not object to the Section 4 notification and 
F 
the Section 6 declaration by filing ob

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