DELHI ADMINISTRATION (NOW N.C.T. OF DELHI) versus MANOHAR LAL

Citation: [2002] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 1 · Decided: 29-08-2002 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DORAISWAMY RAJU · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
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Judgment (excerpt)

DELHI ADMINISTRATION (NOW N.C.T. OF DELHI) 
A 
V. 
MANOHAR LAL 
AUGUST 29, 2002 
[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.) 
B 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 433 (d)-Commutation of 
se/1/ence-Power of-Trial court convicted and sentenced offender under 
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954-First Appellate Court confirmed C 
the same-High Court commuted the se/1/ence and issued mandatory directions 
to Government--Correctness of-Held, High Court cannot assume powers 
when statute specifical~v ell/rusts it to the appropriate Govemment-Prevention 
of Food Adulteration Act. 1954. 
Precedent--Not to be applied mechanically-Courts to find out the ratio, D 
ascertain the law and then apply it appropriately to the cases before them. 
Respondent was convicted and sentenced for an offence under 
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. First Appellate Court upheld 
the conviction and refused to grant benefit of commutation of sentence to 
respondent. Respondent challenged the order of sentence but not E 
conviction. High Court relying on *Santosh Kumar's case and the 
statement of counsel for the State conceding that the case in hand was 
similar to *Samosh Kumar's case granted benefit of commutation of 
sentence under Section 433(d) Cr.P.C. and directed the respondent to 
deposit Rs. 20,000 as fine in trial court and inform Government of such F 
deposit. 
In appeal to this Court, State contended that High Court could not 
order for commutation of sentence, once conviction of respondent was 
upheld and no jurisdictional or other error of any kind was also found in 
the sentence imposed and that the offence of food adulteration is a social G 
evil and when legislature has mandated a minimum sentence for a given 
violation, it would not be proper for ordering commutation resulting in 
circumvention of.legislative intention. 
Disposing of the appeal, the Court 
H 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 
A 
HELD: I. I High Court was merely swayed by considerations of 
,judicial comity and propriety and failed to see that merely because this 
Court has issued directions in some other cases, to deal with ihe fact 
situation in those other cases, in the purported exercise of its undoubted 
inherent and plenary powers to do complete justice, keeping aside even 
technicalities, High Court, exercising statutory powers under the Criminal 
B Laws of land, could not afford to assume to itself the powers or jurisdiction 
to do the same or similar things. High Court and all other courts in the 
country were no doubt ordained to follow and apply the law declared by 
this Court, but that does not absolve them of the obligation and 
responsibility to find out the ratio of the decision and ascertain the law, if 
C any, so declared from a careful reading of the decision concerned and only 
thereafter proceed to apply it appropriately to the cases before them. 
15-F-H; 6-AJ 
1.2. In *Santosh Kumar's and **N. Sukwnaran Nair's cases no law has 
been declared nor any principle or question of law has been decided or 
D laid down and this Court gave certain directions to dispose of the matter 
in the special circumstances noticed by it and the need felt. The same could 
not have been mechanically adopted as a general formula to dispose of, 
as a matter of routine, all cases coming before any or all the courts as an 
universal and invariable solution in all such future cases also. Thus, High 
E Court had no justifying reason to disturb the conclusion of First Appellate 
Court. 16-A-Ci 
F 
*Santosh Kumar v. Municipal Corporation and Anr., 1200019 SCC 151 
= 2000 Crl. L.J. 2777 and **N. Sukumaran Nair v. Food Inspector, 
Mavelikara, 1199719SCC101, referred to. 
i 
2.1. In the instant case, High Court commuted the sentence and 
issued a mandatory direction to Government with no discretion or liberty 
left with it to exercise powers under Section 433 (d) Cr.P.C., the same being 
part of the residuary sovereign power of the State, except to 'formalise 
the same', on payment of fine amount specified by Court. This is nothing 
G but assuming powers where there are none for High Court and where the 
statute concerned specifically entrusts it to only the appropriate 
Gover.nment. J6-G-HJ 
State of Punjab v. Kesar Singh. 119961 5 SCC 495, relied on. 
H 
2.2. Even the appropriate Government may not, as a matter ·or 
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DELMI ADMINISTRATION v. MANOI-JAR LAL (D. RA.JU. .I.] 
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routine course, indulge in exercise of such powers at its s
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