LexDEEP CHAND versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS
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I959 January z5. 8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp. DEEP CHAND v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS (and connected appeal) (S. R. DAS, c. J., N. H. BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA, K. 8-uBBA RAO and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.) Transport Service-Scheme of nationalisation formulated under State enactment of Amendment of Central Act-Ejfect-Repugnancy -Constitutional validity of State enactment-Uttar Pradesh Trans- port Service (Development) Act (IX of r955), s. rr(5)-Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, r956 (roo of r956), Ch. IV A-General Clauses Act, r897 (roof r897), s. 6-Constitution of India-Articles I], JI, 245, 246, 254. These appeals impugned the constitutionality of the Uttar Pradesh Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955 (U. P. IX of 1955), passed by the State Legislature after obtaining the assent of the President, and the validity of the scheme of na tionalisa- tion framed and the notifications issued by the State Government under it. The appellants as permit-holders under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, were plying buses on different 'routes in Uttar Pradesh along with buses owned by the State Government. The State Government issued a notification under s. 3 of the impugn- ed Act directing that the said routes along with others should be exclusively served by the State buses, and followed up that notification by others under ss. 4 and 8 of the Act. The appel- lants moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the said Act and the notifications therennder. The High Court rejected their petitions and there- after came into force the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act (100 of 1956), inserting Ch. IV A into the Act, which provided for nationalisation of transport services. The contentions raised on behalf of the appellants were,-(1) that the passing of the Amending Act made the impugned Act wholly void under Art. 254(1) of the Constitution, (2) that the scheme framed under the impugned Act fell within the purview of s. 68B of the Amending Act and ceased to be operative and (3) that even 'assuming that the impugned Act was valid in so far as the scheme \Vas concern- ed, it violated Art. 31 as it stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955· A further contention on the basis of the proviso to Art. 254(2) was that the impugued Act stood "· wholly repealed by the Amending Act, s. 68B of the latter excluding the operation of the General Clauses Act. It was contended, inter alia, on behalf of .the State that the amendment of Art. 31 by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. having removed, before the scheme under the impugned Act had (2) S.O.R. SUPREME OOUR'l' REPORTS yet been framed, the constitutional limitation which that Article z959 had imposed on the Legislature when it passed the impugned Act, had the effect of validating that Act passed by it at a time Dup Chand when it was subject to the limitation. v. ' Held, (per curiam), that the Uttar Pradesh Transport The State 0! Uttar Service (Development) Act, 1955, did not, on the passing of the Pradesh & Othtrs Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (mo of 1956), become wholly void under Art. 254(1) of the Constitution but continued to be a valid and subsisting law supporting the scheme already framed under the U.P. Act. Even assuming that the Amending Act had the effect, under Art. 254(2), of repealing the State Act, such repeal could not nullify the scheme already framed under that Act, for the provisions of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act would operate to save it. Nor could it be said, having regard to the provisions of the impugned Act and particularly s. u(5) thereof, that it offended Art. 31 of the Constitution as it stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, by failing to provide for the payment of adequate compensation. Per Das, C.J., and Sinha, ].-There was no reason why the doctrine of eclipse as explained in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 589, could not also apply to a post-Constitution .law that infringed a fundamental right conferred on citizens alone. Such a law, though shadowed and rendered ineffective by the fundamental right so far as the citizens were concerned, would remain effective so far as non- citizens were concerned. The moment the shadow was removed by a constitutional amendment, the law would apply to citizens without re-enactment. John M. Wilkerson v. Charfrs A.
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