DAYA SHANKAR versus STATE OF M.P.
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[2009] 1 S.C.R. 386 A DAYA SHANKAR II. STATE OF M.P. (Criminal Appeal No. 105 of 2009) B JANUARY 20, 2009 , [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR GANGUL Y, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860: c s.302 rlw s.34 - Conviction under- Applicability of s.34 challenged - Held: No overl act attributed to appellant - Mere fact that he was in company of accused who were armed not sufficient to attract s.34 - Appellant was not armed and had no animosity with deceased - Stand that he pulled the legs ._ D of deceased was not established - Appellant not guilty by ~ application of s.34. s.34 - Common intention - Nature and applicability of. E Prosecution case was that the deceased had eloped with the sister of A-2 and performed marriage _with her. They started living in some other village and ret~ned to his village a month before the incident. On the fateful day, when deceased went to the fields to answer to call of '> F nature, A-2 armed with sword, A-3 armed with axe along with A-1 (appellant) and A-4 reached there. Appellant and A-4 pulled the legs of deceased and threw him on the ground. Deceased fell on the crops in the field. A-2 assaulted the deceased by sword on the chest and then G placed his sword on the chest of the deceased. On account of beatings, the deceased died. The Trial Court convicted the accused persons under s.302 r. w. s.34 IPC. ~ ... _ • Before the High Court, the basic stand was that the prosecution failed to prove common intention on the part H 386 DAYA SHANKAR v. STATE OF M.P. 387 • of the appellant and therefore, s.34 IPC had no A application; and that merely because the appellant had "' accompanied other accused persons, that was not " sufficient to warrant presumption of common intention. ... Allowing the appeal, the Court B HELD: 1.1. s.34 IPC has been enacted on the principle ... of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the section is the element of participation in action. The liability of c one person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises under s.34 if such criminal act is done in -- furtherance of a common intention of the persons who ~ join in committing the crime. Direct proof of common D intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by E evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the ~ aid of s.34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the F crime. The true contents of the Section are that if two or more persons interitionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the;same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. It is not necessary that the acts =ct of the several persons charged with commission of an G offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. .. " The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in order to attract the provision. [Para 7) [391-8-G] Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab AIR 1977 SC 109, relied H 388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R. A on. 1.2. The section does not say "the common intention of all", nor does it say "and intention common to all". ,_ Under the provisions of s.34 the essence of the liability B is to be found in the existence of a common intention ~ animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in s.34, when an accused is convicted under s.302 read with s.34, in law c it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove - D exactly what part was taken by each of them. For "' applying s.34 it is not necessary to show some over
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